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SUMMARY 
 
Nuclear energy is seen as a risk in modern era, and disasters like Chernobyl along with 
Fukushima helped to influence this approach. For example, France gets majority of its energy from  
nuclear power plants, and other countries, like Hungary, UK, Belarus etc. are planning to build new 
reactors, though Germany started to close its nuclear reactors after the Fukushima disaster. It could be 
seen, that policy implementation and decision making depends significantly on governments approach, 
which is discoursively constructed. Nuclear power plant being built in Belarus is important topic both 
in Belarus and Lithuania‘s public discourses. Astravets nuclear power plant (BelNPP) can have impact 
on different areas, like economy, safety, environment and politics. In order to have a better 
understanding, on how political actors speak of Astravets nuclear power plant, political discourse 
analysis has been performed.  
Research problem is that political discourses on Astravets nuclear power plant in Belarus and 
Lithuania might have different framing, but this issue is little researched. The aim of this project is to 
conduct a comparative analysis of the content of Belarusian and Lithuanian political discourses on 
Astravets nuclear power plant. The tasks of the project are: to develop a theoretical framework for 
explaining political discourse on nuclear power and to describe the case of Astravets nuclear power 
plant; to adapt content analysis and discourse analysis methodologies for researching political 
communicative discourses on Astravets nuclear power plant in Belarus and Lithuania; to analyse the 
content of political communicative discourses on Astravets nuclear power plant communicated in 
Belarus and Lithuania by the respective Parliament and Government; to examine the differences of the 
discourse content. 
For a theoretical framework several theories have been used: discursive institutionalism, agenda-
setting, and issue framing. Examination of energy policies in Belarus and Lithuania was performed. 
For a research purpose, in order to gather data, official news sources of Parliaments and Governments, 
from both countries, have been used. News and press releases from the period of 2012-2017 october 
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4th, that have been communicated by political actors, that represent Parliament and Government of 
Belarus or Lithuania have been sampled out. Sampled news and press releases were coded, using open 
coding technique and followed the principles of abduction (deductive and inductive coding combined). 
Main codes cover discourse actors, main discourse topics, timeline etc. Nvivo software for qualitative 
and mixed methods research has been used for the analysis. 
The most significant differences between Belarus’ and Lithuania’s political communicative 
discourses on BelNPP are: topics of ‘safety’, ‘technical aspects’, and ‘information provision’ are most 
frequent in Belarus, although in Lithuania most pronounced topics are ‘safety’, ‘politics’ and 
‘environment’. The ‘safety’ topic is important in both of the discourses; though in Belarus it is 
constructed mostly with a positive emotional load, and in Lithuania – mostly with negative one.  In 
general, discourse on BelNPP in Belarus mostly has a positive or neutral emotional load; in Lithuania 
the discourse is dominated by negative emotional load. Moreover, in Belarus International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA)  has been the most common international organization; in Lithuania it was 
Espoo Convention. In Belarusian discourse Lithuania is typically seen in the light of conflicting, 
cooperative, or informing relationship. In Lithuanian discourse Belarus is typically spoken about 
mentioning conflicting relationships. It is noted, that in Belarusian political discourse Lithuania is the 
only discourse actor associated with conflicting relationships. More discourse actors are mentioned in 
the light of conflicting relationships in Lithuanian discourse: Belarus, Government, Parliament and 
Russia.  
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SANTRAUKA 
 
Atominė energetika yra matoma kaip rizika šiame amžiuje, ir tokios katastrofos kaip Černobylio 
kartu su Fukušimos padėjo įsivyrauti šiam požiūriui. Pavyzdžiui, Prancūzija gauna didžiąją dalį savo 
energijos iš branduolinės energetikos, ir kitos šalys kaip Vengrija, Jungtinė Karalystė ir t.t. planuoja 
statyti naujus reaktorius, vis dėlto Vokietija pradėjo uždarinėti savo atomines elektrines po Fukušimos 
katastrofos. Galima teigti, jog politikos įgyvendinimas ir sprendimų priėmimas reikšmingai priklauso 
nuo valdžios požiūrio, kuris gali būti diskursyviai konstruojamas. Statoma atominė elektrinė 
Baltarusijoje yra svarbi tema tiek Baltarusijos, tiek Lietuvos viešuosiuose diskursuose. Astravo 
atominė elektrinė gali turėti įtakos tokioms sritims kaip ekonomikai, saugumui, politikai. Siekiant 
geresnio supratimo apie tai, kaip politiniai aktoriai kalba apie Astravo atominę elektrinę, buvo atlikta 
politinių diskursų analizė. 
Tyrimo problema šiame darbe yra ta, jog politiniai diskursai Astravo atominės elektrinės tema 
gali būti skirtingai konstruojami, tačiau ši problema yra mažai ištirta. Tikslas yra atlikti Baltarusijos ir 
Lietuvos  politinių diskursų palyginamąją turinio analizę Astravo atominės elektrinės tema. Užduotys 
yra tokios kaip: išvystyti  teorinį pagrindą siekiant paaiškinti politinį diskursą apie branduolinę 
energetiką, bei paaiškinti Astravo atominės elektrinės atvejį; pritaikyti turinio analizės ir diskurso 
analizės metodiką siekiant ištirti politinius komunikacinius diskursus Astravo atominės elektrinės tema 
Baltarusijoje ir Lietuvoje; išanalizuoti politinio komunikacinio diskurso turinį Astravo atominės 
elektrinės tema Baltarusijoje ir Lietuvoje; išnagrinėti diskurso turinio skirtumus. 
Teorinei tyrimo daliai buvo naudojamos kelios pagrindinės teorijos: diskursyvusis 
institucionalizmas, darbotvarkės nustatymo, bei klausimų kadravimo. Šios teorijos leidžia paaiškinti 
politinio diskurso konstravimo procesą. Taip pat buvo išnagrinėtos Baltarusijos ir Lietuvos energetikos 
politikos. Tyrimo tikslais, siekiant surinkti duomenis, buvo panaudoti oficialūs abiejų šalių 
vyriausybės ir parlamento naujienų šaltiniai. Pasirinkta atrinkti politinių aktorių naujienas, kurios buvo 
komunikuojamos Baltarusijos ir Lietuvos vyriausybių, bei parlamento narių. Atrinktos naujienos buvo 
koduotos atvira kodavimo technika, bei sekant deduktyvaus ir induktyvaus kodavimo principus. 
Pagrindiniai kodai apima tokias temas kaip diskurso aktoriai, pagrindinės diskurso temos, chronologija 
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ir t.t. Analizei buvo naudojamas Nvivo programinės įrangos paketas skirtas kokybiniams ir mišriems 
tyrimų metodams. 
Buvo gauti pagrindiniai skirtumai tarp Baltarusijos ir Lietuvos politinių diskursų.  Baltarusijos 
diskurse vyrauja pagrindinės temos kaip sauga, techniniai aspektai, ir informacijos sklaida, tačiau 
Lietuvoje pagrindinės temos yra sauga, politika, ir aplinkosauga. Tema susijusi su sauga yra svarbi 
abiejų šalių diskursuose, tačiau Baltarusijoje ji yra konstruojama pozityviai, o Lietuvoje – negatyviai. 
Apibendrinant, Astravo atominės elektrinės diskursas Baltarusijoje buvo konstruojamas daugiausiai 
pozityviai, o tuo tarpu Lietuvoje – daugiausia negatyviai. Be to, Baltarusijos atveju TATENA buvo 
dažniausiai minima tarptautinė organizacija, o Lietuvoje Espo konvencija buvo minima dažniausiai. 
Baltarusijos diskurse Lietuva yra matoma kaip turinti skirtingus santykius: prieštaringą, 
bendradarbiaujantį, bei informuojantį. Tuo tarpu Lietuvos diskurse Baltarusija yra matoma daugiausiai 
prieštaringame ryšyje. Taip pat verta pabrėžti jog Lietuva yra vienintelis diskurso aktorius 
Baltarusijoje turintis prieštaringą ryšį. Lietuvos diskurse prieštaringą ryšį turėjo tokie veikėjai kaip 
Baltarusija, vyriausybė, Seimas, ir Rusija. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear energy and nuclear power plants are seen as risk factors that are dangerous and can 
cause disasters at a regional level (Ulrich, 2015). According to various public discourses (Perrow, 
2011), it could even seem that disasters are inevitable. Yet other experts state that nuclear energy 
provides more benefits than risks (Wilkerson, 2016). However, seeing nuclear energy as a risk is 
having influence for decision making. For example, Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, which had similar 
design to Chernobyl’s nuclear power plant has been closed due to pressure from the EU because of the 
safety concerns, although it faced strong public opposition against the closure (WNA, 2017). After the 
Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant disaster in 2011 nuclear safety of power plants became more 
important. European Commission took action and reviewed the safety features of European nuclear 
power plants (EC, 2012) and applied ‘stress tests’ for all of the plants in the European Union (EU). 
Nuclear risk acceptance varies significantly between the countries. A single country like Germany 
reviewed its energy policy and in 2012 closed eight of its nuclear reactors for political reasons (WNA, 
2017). Although France still gets three quarters of its energy from nuclear power and countries like 
The United Kingdom, Poland etc. are planning to build new nuclear reactors. It could be seen that 
energy policy implementation depends significantly on politics and governmental approach, which can 
be subjective. 
In Lithuania’s public discourse, nuclear safety is important for a long time already, but gained a 
new momentum due to Belarussian Astravets Nuclear Power Plant (BelNPP) being built near 
Lithuanian border. BelNPP can have impact in different areas, like economy, safety, political 
influence, and politics plays a crucial role in this matter. Although Lithuania had plans to build its own 
nuclear power plant, but Astravets nuclear power plant is distinct as according to Lithuania’s public 
discourse the project is likely to cause nuclear safety issues. Belarus denies claims on safety related 
issues. It is important to analyse political discourses of Lithuania and Belarus to see what is the content 
of communications by politicians about the situation. Comparative analysis of political actors’ 
communications that represents Parliaments and Governments of Belarus and Lithuania will be 
performed in order to examine the political discourse on a national level. 
Currently, there is a single research conducted by performing discourse analysis on Belarusian 
and Lithuanian texts in relation with nuclear energy by V. Pilibaitytė (2011) “Nuclear energy 
discourses in Lithuania and Belarus”. Although the discourse analysis is based on media texts dated 
2006-2009, and conducted using different methodology. So the current paper is going to provide 
additional information in this field. There are also a couple of Political Sciences articles published on 
Astravets Nuclear Power Plant. First one is “Lithuanian foreign policy vis-à-vis Belarusian nuclear 
power plant in Ostrovets” by Justinas Juozaitis (2016) about the implementation of Lithuania’s foreign 
12 
 
policy towards BelNPP. Second writing is “Nuclear Geopolitics in the Baltic Sea Region” by Giedrius 
Česnakas and Justinas Juozaitis (2017) which introduces Russia’s relation with BelNPP and its 
political background. 
Problem. What is the content of institutional political communicative discourses as produced by 
Belarus’ and Lithuania’s Parliaments and Governments about Astravets nuclear power plant related 
issues? 
Object. Political communicative discourses on Astravets nuclear power plant. 
Aim. To conduct a comparative analysis of the content of Belarusian and Lithuanian political 
discourses on Astravets nuclear power plant. 
Tasks: 
1. To develop a theoretical framework for explaining political discourse on nuclear 
power and to describe the case of Astravets nuclear power plant. 
2. To adapt content analysis and discourse analysis methodologies for researching 
political communicative discourses on Astravets nuclear power plant in Belarus and 
Lithuania 
3. To analyse the content of political communicative discourses on Astravets nuclear 
power plant communicated in Belarus and Lithuania by the respective Parliament and 
Government. 
4. To examine the differences of the discourse content. 
Methods: In order to develop a theoretical framework for explaining political discourse on 
Astravets nuclear power plant relevant scientific literature review has been used. Furthermore, content 
analysis of communications by Belarus and Lithuania’s political actors of Parliament and Government 
has been performed. It has been chosen to separate communications which were published since 2012. 
This was achieved by coding the content with abductively generated list of codes using Nvivo software 
for qualitative and mixed methods of research which was later used to perform descriptive analysis on 
the content of political discourses. Data analysis methods included qualitative content analysis and 
quantitative content analysis: word frequency, cluster analysis, coding intensity (hierarchy charts), 
measuring relations between variables or measuring coding differences between texts (matrix coding).   
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING POLITICAL 
DISCOURSES ON NUCLEAR POWER 
In the first part of this section theoretical analysis will be performed using theories that enable 
political discourse conceptualisation. In order to do so discursive institutionalism, agenda-setting and 
issue framing theories will be used. In the second part, it is important to introduce the case of Astravets 
Nuclear Power Plant which is being built in Belarus. Pre-history of the power plant, current situation 
and why it is a relevant and problematic topic will be described. The third part of the section will be 
dedicated to examination of energy policies in Belarus and Lithuania. Lithuania’s energy policy is 
significantly related to the EU energy policy, as the latter has legislative power over Lithuania, for this 
reason the EU energy policy will be included into the examination. It is necessary to do so for a better 
understanding on how these two countries develop regulatory frameworks in energy sector, also, with 
accordance to nuclear energy. Furthermore, nuclear security and safety will be reviewed as this is 
closely related with issues that Astravets Nuclear Power Plant faces. Additionally, legislation review 
will be performed, in order to see how Belarus and Lithuania are interrelated from a legal point in 
accordance with nuclear safety and security. 
1.1 Theoretical Conceptualisation of Political Discourse 
First of all, it is important to define political discourse and its place in the research. It is not an 
easy task to define what discourse or political discourse is, as there are many possible interpretations 
of it. In Oxford dictionaries (2017) discourse is defined as “written or spoken communication or 
debate”, also “a formal discussion of a topic in speech or writing” or “a connected series of utterances; 
a text or conversation”. In this case, text and language are the most important parts of the discourse. 
Though, according to A. Telešienė (2005, p. 1), social science extends discourse definition by 
accentuating discourse as a social action, the concept of special interaction. This way, not only spoken 
or written text becomes important for a discourse analysis, but also actors that create, communicate 
and interpret it, and direct or historical contexts that enable or restrict discourse. 
According to J. Wilson (2003, p. 2), “the study of political discourse, like that of other areas of 
discourse analysis, covers a broad range of subject matter, and draws on a wide range of analytic 
methods”. But “political discourse analysis first of all should be able to define its proper object of 
study: What exactly is 'political discourse'?’ (Dijk, n.d., p. 2). With reference to Teun A. van Dijk 
(n.d., p. 2), political discourse is identified by its actors or authors, for example, politicians. In this 
paper political discourse actors (authors) are Belarus and Lithuania’s politicians that communicate on 
relevant topics while representing political institutions, in this case Parliament and Government. 
Moreover the biggest share of studies on political discourse is about the text and talk of professional 
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politicians or political institutions, such as presidents and prime ministers and other members of 
government, parliament or political parties, both at the local, national and international levels. So 
political discourse is “concerned with formal/informal political contexts and political actors with, that 
is, inter alia, politicians, political institutions, governments, political media, and political supporters 
operating in political environments to achieve political goals” (Wilson J. , 2003, p. 1). 
The term to ‘achieve political goals’ has to be separated in the research as it describes “political 
potential of language” (Wilson J. , 2003, p. 1). According to J. Wilson (2003, p. 12), George Orwell 
first paid attention to political use of language, as he wrote article ‘Politics and the English Language’. 
In the text author considers the way in which language may be used to manipulate thought. And “one 
of the core goals of political discourse analysis is to seek out the ways in which language choice is 
manipulated for specific political effect” (Wilson J. , 2005). 
This gives that in the political discourse manipulation of meaning is a relevant aspect. This 
aspect of the discourse is important due to the characteristics of politics. According to S. Ismail (n.d., 
p. 2), indicating to the simple subject that has been found in the traditional study of politics, Chilton 
and Schaffner (2002, p. 5) define politics as “a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert 
and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it”. “This theme draws its shadow on the 
linguistic construction of such type of discourse. Consequently, politicians use language as a means of 
conveying political agendas that are, at most, far from the truth” (Ismail, n.d., p. 2). This can be seen  
in  Chilton's (2008, p. 226) definition  of  political discourse as “the use of language to do the business 
of politics  and  includes  persuasive  rhetoric,  the  use  of implied meanings, the use of euphemisms, 
the exclusion of references to undesirable reality, the use of language to arouse political emotions and 
the  like”. It means that political discourse is not constructed neutrally as a typical communication. But 
rather it is “compared with the discourse of advertising which is designed to lead its audience in the 
direction of particular thoughts, beliefs, and ultimately actions” (Gloria, 2015, p. 28). In this paper 
political discourse analysis will be used. “One of the main research methods in international relations 
is political discourse analysis” (Jaanika, 2012, p. 3). In the research communications on a relevant 
topic by political actors from Belarus and Lithuania will be analysed. Purpose of it is to identify what 
is the content of political discourses on Astravets nuclear power plant. 
First theory to be used is Discursive Institutionalism (DI) which helps to explain institutional 
context of the political discourse. This theory has originally been developed in political sciences. It has 
main goal to “reconcile, as well as extend, the potential of institutional theories to study stability and 
change” (Kromidha & Cordoba-Pachon, 2017). It is also called as the fourth “new institutionalism”. 
This perspective tends to concentrate on ideas and discourse, particularly in institutional context. The 
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approach distinguished discourses into coordinative and communicative, which will be briefly 
examined in this section, as well as simple polities and compound polities will be defined. 
 Change is significant factor in a frame of this theory. “Discursive Institutionalism endogenizes 
change, explaining much of how and why public actors bring about institutional change through public 
action” (Schmidt V. A., 2010). Moreover DI focuses both on ideas and discourse (Sigurdardottir, 
2015). Also “on the interactive processes that serve to generate those ideas and communicate them to 
the public“ (Schmidt V. , 2008). „The ‘institutionalism’ in the term, moreover, highlights the fact that 
this is not only about the communication of ideas or ‘text’ but also about the institutional context in 
which and through which ideas are communicated via discourse“ (Schmidt V. A., 2008). These ideas 
is segregated into three main levels of generality: 
• Policies: specific policies proposed by policy makers or „policy solutions“; 
• Programs: more general programs that underpin the policy ideas, these reflect underlying 
assumptions or organizing principles; 
• Publis philosophies: these ideas tend to sit in the background as underlying assumptions 
that are rarely contested except in times of crisis. (Sigurdardottir, 2015) 
From this follows two types of content: 
• Cognitive: „what is and what to do“; 
• Normative: „what is good or bad about what is“ in light of „what one ought to do“. 
(Sigurdardottir, 2015) 
DI is seen as a fourth of the “new institutionalisms” together with historical, sociological and 
rational choice institutionalism (Schmidt V. , 2008). As an approach, it is closely related to 
sociological institutionalism. “The difference between the two is more one of degree than kind: 
discursive institutionalism treats ideas as “dynamic constructs”, while sociological institutionalism 
treats them as “static structures”” (Gorp, 2015). Discourse, as defined by Schmidt, is “whatever policy 
actors say to one another and to the public in their efforts to generate and legitimize a policy 
programme” J. Gorp (2015) citing Schmidt (2002: 210). “The institutional context of a country also 
matters, for it frames the discourse” (Gorp, 2015). 
Two approaches of the discourse are separated: the ‘coordinative’ and ‘communicative’. “The 
‘coordinative’ discourse among policy actors engaged in creating, arguing, bargaining, and reaching 
agreement on public policies in the policy sphere and the ‘communicative’ discourse between political 
actors and the public engaged in presenting, contesting, deliberating, and legitimating such policies in 
the political sphere” (Schmidt V. A., Bringing Ideas and Discourse Back into the Explanation of 
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Change in Varieties of Capitalism and Welfare States, 2008). This paper is related to the 
‘communicative’ discourses as it is concerned with how those policies are communicated to the public. 
The ‘communicative discourse’ consist of “political actors who, as political leaders, government 
spokespeople, party activists, ‘spin doctors,’ and more, communicate the policy ideas and programs 
developed in the context of the coordinative discourse to the public for discussion and deliberation in a 
mass process of public persuasion” (Borras & Seabrooke, 2015, p. 157). 
Simple polities and compound polities are relevant for the theory. “Schmidt argues that due to a 
stronger executive and the limited need to compromise with others, simple polities are characterized 
by stronger communicative discourse and weaker coordinative discourse. The opposite holds for 
compound polities. They will see stronger coordinative discourse because political actors need to 
coordinate and compromise with one another” (Gorp, 2015). By adapting this theory for the paper, 
Belarus would see itself as a simple polity together with stronger communicative discourse. The reason 
for this is because government there tends to be concentrated. Open discussions on the important 
matters are less likely to happen, although government has to justify its action in order not to face 
consequences, for example protests or loss of rating and approval from the public. In the case of 
Astravets nuclear power plant, Belarus government is more likely to implement a controversial project 
due to its authority, but justification is necessary, which can be achieved by paying significant 
attention to a communicative discourse. Lithuania would see itself as a compound polity, with strong 
coordinative discourse. Governance is distributed among different bodies, that all have to 
communicate and cooperate with each other. Controversial and significant projects are less likely, for 
example Visaginas nuclear power plant that faced controversy and eventually is not being 
implemented. In cooperative discourse communications between the institutions are more likely to 
happen. 
Furthermore, in order to explain the communicative political discourse, agenda setting theory 
will be used. According to M. McCombs and A. Reynolds (2002) agenda setting theory describes 
“ability of the news media to influence the salience of topics on the public agenda”. It is understood 
that the most important issues recognized by people are the same ones, which media communicated on 
the most. There are two main points that underlie most research on agenda-setting: 
• the press and the media do not reflect reality; they filter and shape it; 
• media concentration on a few issues and subjects leads the public to perceive those issues 
as more important than other issues. (UT, 2017) 
“One of the most critical aspects in the concept of an agenda-setting role of mass communication 
is the time frame for this phenomenon. In addition, different media have different agenda-setting 
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potential. Agenda-setting theory seems quite appropriate to help us understand the pervasive role of 
the media (for example on political communication systems)” (UT, 2017). 
Rogers and Dearing (1988) distinguish three main types of agenda setting. They are: public 
agenda setting; media agenda setting; policy agenda setting. According to A. Freeland (2012) public 
agenda setting focuses on the audience’s agenda while media agenda setting focuses on the influence 
of the mass media on the audience. Policy agenda setting deals with how media and public agendas 
might influence the decisions of elite policy makers. A. Freeland (2012, p. 4) citing S. Walgrave and P. 
Van Aelst (2006) “this part of the theory has since been explored by other scholars who want to further 
examine the factors that influence elite policy makers agendas”. In reference to M. Filipova (2006, p. 
83) “Agenda Setting has two levels. As mentioned in Theories of Communication, the first level enacts 
the common subjects that are most important, and the second level decides what parts of the subject 
are important. These two levels of agenda setting lead path into what is the function of this concept”. 
And concept is process that is divided into three parts that were already mentioned above. 
 
Figure 1. Proposed agenda setting model in the social media era (Albalawi, 2015). 
Agenda setting theory has developed since the introduction of it. “Today, social media have 
become a new arena of policy debate bringing potentially different agenda dynamics to the table. In  
other  words,  they will have  their  own  agenda  logic  of  prioritizing  and  framing  issues” (Dekker, 
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2013, p. 4). Furthermore, Y. Albalawi (2015) cites A. Zheluk, J. Gillespie and C. Quinn (2012) 
“simple application of agenda setting in the era of social media does not reflect the complex process of 
communication resulting from the use of social media platforms”. According to Y. Albalawi (2015), it 
is argued “that understanding agenda setting theory in the social media era should cover two levels of 
engagement: the first centres on agenda setting within the social media sphere and the second is related 
to the position of social media within the classic agenda-setting process implemented in the real 
world”. Social media has been introduced in the agenda setting framework as a separate matter having 
its specific agenda (Figure 1). In this paper analysis is based on policy agenda. The most relevant 
topics related with BelNPP and its context will be indicated. This will show which topics by policy 
makers are considered important. According to the theory, the same topics are considered important by 
the public, and the public have influence to the policy agenda. 
It is also important to mention Framing and Issue Framing theories to help us understand the 
process of political discourses construction. The framing approach is related to the agenda setting 
theory but extends the research by concentrating not on exact subject, but on the nature of closely 
related issues instead. The main point of the framing theory is that the media concentrates its focus on 
certain cases and after that put them within a sphere of meaning. Framing is a relevant theory as it is 
influential and moreover the approach of framing is extended to the institutional level. 
Framing is “a process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or 
reorient their thinking about an issue” (Chong & Druckman, Framing Theory, 2007). A framing effect 
occurs when, in describing an issue or event, a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant 
considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when forming their opinions 
(Druckman J. , 2001). For example, “the media draws the public attention to certain topics, it decides 
where people think about, the journalists select the topics” (UT, 2017). This represents the common 
idea of the agenda setting. Although “in news items occurs more than only bringing up certain topics. 
The way in which the news is brought, the frame in which the news is presented, is also a choice made 
by journalists. Thus, a frame refers to the way media and media gatekeepers organize and present the 
events and issues they cover, and the way audiences interpret what they are provided” (UT, 2017). 
Despite the fact this is an example of how media frames the matter, this also represents how political 
discourse can be framed by political actors or political institutions. Issues related to Astravets nuclear 
power plant can be framed by political actors that represent Parliament and Government in Belarus and 
Lithuania. This way political institutions are able to frame the matter regarding BelNPP in the 
direction that is desired. Framed approaches towards BelNPP may be different in Belarus and 
Lithuania, which means different content of communications. Furthermore, “frames are abstract 
notions that serve to organize or structure social meanings. Frames influence the perception of the 
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news of the audience, this form of agenda-setting not only tells what to think about, but also how to 
think about it” (UT, 2017). 
There has been some opinions about agenda-setting and framing being basically the same 
theoretical model. According to A. Ardevol-Abreu (2015, p. 4), since the late 1990s, some authors, led 
by Maxwell McCombs, “have argued that framing is equivalent to the second level of the agenda-
setting theory, and have proposed the integration of both models”. McCombs, Llamas, López-Escobar 
and Rey (1997), cited by A. Ardevol-Abreu (2015) “considered that framing is a natural extension of 
the agenda-setting model. According to this interpretation, frames would not be more than a special 
type of attributes – macro-attributes (second-level agenda setting theory) that due to their complexity 
allow us to define the problem, to interpret its causes and to propose a treatment”. 
Framing techniques according to Fairhurst and Sarr (1996):  
• Metaphor: A theoretical concept is framed over comparison with other objects. 
• Stories (legends, myths): Subject is framed through the story in powerful and notable 
form. 
• Tradition (rituals, ceremonies): Cultural attitudes with a possibility to inspire 
importance in everyday lives, closely related with artefacts. 
• Slogan, jargon, catchphrase: Framing something by memorable expression in order to 
achieve significance and to make it identifiable. 
• Artefact: Objects having basic significant purpose – observable or cultural matter that 
has more significance than the object itself. 
• Contrast: Description of the object regarding what it is not. 
• Spin: to introduce an idea in specific style as to bring a value judgement (positive or 
negative) which possibly could not be instantly obvious;  
• to present a concept in such a way as to convey a value judgement (positive or 
negative) that might not be immediately apparent. 
Separating Issue Framing theory, according to R. Slothuus and C. Vreese (2010, p. 2) “issue 
framing is one of the most important means of elite influence on public opinion. We understand issue 
framing as a process in which a communicator ‘defines and constructs a political issue or public 
controversy’ (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997, p. 567) by emphasizing ‘a subset of potentially 
relevant considerations’ (Druckman & Kjersten, 2003, p. 730) and thereby pointing the receiver to ‘the 
essence of the issue’” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). A framing effect occurs when such 
‘frames in communication’ subsequently affect the ‘frames in thought’ of the receivers, that is, their 
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cognitive understanding of a given situation and/or their opinion (Chong & Druckman, Framing 
Theory, 2007). From this paper perspective framing could be used by Belarus and Lithuanian political 
actors to frame an issue on Astravets nuclear power plant in a way that is convenient for them. This 
approach can be helpful to achieve political goals or to justify their actions. Receivers, which is 
general society in this case, can accept the message provided by political discourse actors and approve 
or support their actions. 
1.2 The Case of Astravets Nuclear Power Plant 
The research presented in this thesis is built on a case of Astravets nuclear power plant. In order 
to better understand, how and why this power plant has become part of political agendas both in 
Belarus and Lithuania, the comprehensive case description is presented as a separate chapter. First of 
all, according to World Nuclear Association (2017) under its 2011-2020 energy strategy, “Belarus is 
seeking to reduce its reliance on Russia as a major energy supplier”. In order to do so, Belarus is 
planning to build coal-fired plant, nuclear power plant, four hydropower stations and to work on wind 
projects. “If fully implemented, the strategy would bring the share of power generated using Russian 
gas down to 55% by 2020, from over 80% in 2009” (WNA, 2017). 
In November 2007 a presidential decree defined the organizations responsible for preparing for 
the construction of the country's first nuclear power plant and budgeted money for engineering and site 
selection. “The document authorized preparation for the construction of a nuclear power plant in 
Belarus” (Belta, 2014). In 2008 Astravets site in Grodno Oblast has been chosen for the construction 
of BelNPP by the state commission assigned for this purpose. Krasnaya Polyana and Kukshinovo sites 
also have been considered. Astravets is 20km from the Lithuanian border and 50km from Vilnius 
(LGMA, 2016). According to Belarus Environmental Impact Assessment (MERB, n.d.) regarding the 
power plant,  Krasnaya Polyana and Kukshinovo sites were less suitable due to possibilities of karst-
suffusion appearances, also at Kukshinovo site geotechnical and hydrological conditions were 
complex. This resulted that with “regard to foregoing and IAEA recommendations, taking into account 
the importance of safety issues, the Ostrovets site has been identified as the priority site” (MERB, 
n.d.). 
With reference to the World Nuclear Association (2017), “the 2007 decree also aimed to ensure 
that nuclear and radiation safety was in line with the recommendations of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). The Nuclear & Radiation Safety Department was set up as part of the 
Emergencies Ministry to act as the state nuclear regulator and licensing authority”. A further decree in 
2017 established a Centre of Nuclear and Radiation Safety as part of the Emergencies Ministry (WNA, 
2017). In October 2011 a “contractual agreement on the construction of the nuclear power plant in 
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Belarus was signed” (Belta, 2014). It sets the construction of two power generating units of the nuclear 
power plant for a 2400 MWe (2 x 1200). Moreover, general construction contract was signed in July 
2012. The first significant construction works started in November 2013 (Belta, 2014). 
Since the beginning of the Astravets Nuclear Power Plant construction there has been a 
significant amount of accidents and it also received criticism from different sides like politicians or 
environmentalists. According to T. Wesolowsky (2016), there has been accidents, such as a nuclear 
reactor shell drop, while being moved, which has been reported by local news. And the structural 
frame of the nuclear service building at the site collapsed, which was first reported by an independent 
TV station. There also has been some criticism as Minsk possibly failed to carry out an environmental-
impact study for Astravets. However, The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director-
general Yukiya Amano expressed opinion that the nuclear agency “has worked closely with Belarus on 
all aspects of this major project and will continue to offer every assistance”, and that Belarus “is one of 
the most advanced of what the IAEA calls ‘newcomer’ countries” (Gaspar, 2016). 
In reference to P. Baumgartner (2017) “Minsk cites the report of an IAEA Site and External 
Events Design (SEED) visit to Astravets in January 2017 which concluded that officials had taken 
"appropriate steps" to "address all necessary aspects of site safety and site-specific design 
parameters...for relevant external hazards." Although, according to S. de Jong (2017), “such a review 
during a SEED mission can include up to six modules, but the Astravets visit only involved two 
modules of examination, per Minsk's wishes”. This way, “the Belarussian authorities limited the scope 
of the IAEA’s mission only to an assessment of the plant design’s safety. This means that major 
verification steps pertaining to the choice of location, local geology and the plant’s environmental 
impact were skipped” (Jong, 2017). 
International community treats the Belarussian Astravets Nuclear Power Plant as controversial 
project. For example, in a Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Astravets Nuclear Power 
Plant under construction in Belarus (2017) Lithuania advices to stop a construction of the BelNPP. The 
Belarussian public is also split on BelNPP. “A poll conducted by the Independent Institute of Socio-
Economic and Political Studies suggested that a slight majority - 35 percent or respondents - 
disapproved of the project” (Brown, 2016). The poll took place in 2016. Furthermore, according to J. 
Brown (2016), there has been a form of protest, like “during election campaigning, Green Party 
candidate Dmitry Kuchuk appeared on state-run television wearing a gas mask”. Or “Belarusian Nobel 
Prize-winning writer Svetlana Alexievich described Lukashenko's decision to progress plans for the 
nuclear station as "a crime". Protests are still being organized, like for example the march "Chernobyl 
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Way-2017", with a main statement "Stop the nuclear power plant construction in Belarus!" organized 
by Belarusian Christian Democracy party (2017). 
Belarus and Lithuania relation linked to BelNPP started in 2009 after Belarus released plans to 
build its first nuclear power plant and presented preliminary Environmental Impact Assessment. 
Responsible Lithuania’s institutions and experts evaluated data provided by Belarus and suggested 39 
comments, bringing attention to negative consequences if for the construction of the nuclear power 
plant would be chosen Astravets site. Lithuanian institutions also requested to provide information 
based on studies on how the nuclear power plant would influence Neris ecosystem and drinking water, 
how competence of Belarus regulator and independence will be assured etc. Belarus did not take into 
account essential remarks provided by Lithuania; for this reason Lithuania submitted a complaint in 
2011 to United Nations Espoo Convention Implementation committee due to violations of the 
convention in carrying out cross-border Environment Impact Assessment by Belarus. In 2013 Espoo 
Convention Committee acknowledged, and in 2014 during the meeting of Ministers of the Espoo 
convention it has been verified, that Belarus violated Espoo convention and prepared 12 
recommendations for Espoo Convention implementation and improvement, which Belarus is advised 
to implement. Moreover, in 2014 during the meeting of the United Nations Arhus Convention 
conclusions has been adopted that Belarus during construction of the Astravets nuclear power plant 
violated this international agreement – convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. In 2015 Lithuania also submitted a 
complaint regarding this convention. Furthermore, Lithuania requested for full IAEA SEED mission 
and stress tests to be performed by European Union and Lithuanian experts. (LRT, 2016) In the 
following parts of this paper energy policies in Belarus and Lithuania have been reviewed. 
Furthermore, nuclear safety and security definition was detailed, as well as international organizations 
that has jurisdiction regarding nuclear safety and security implementation were reviewed. 
1.3 Energy Politics and Policy 
In this part energy policies in Belarus, Lithuania and the EU, with relation to Lithuania, will be 
examined. It is necessary for a better understanding on how two countries implement their policies in 
energy sector, also in relation with nuclear energy. It allows to explain the reasons why Belarus is 
constructing the nuclear power plant, as well as Lithuania’s background in energy sector, which can 
have influence for its approach towards BelNPP. 
First of all, energy policies are different in countries, as it depends on many different variables 
and issues that countries have to tackle. For example, “between 1991 and 2007, Belarus’s energy 
dependency had gone from 80% to 85% and Lithuania’s from 70% to 62%’ from Russia” (Fraser, 
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2016). So, energy dependency is on political agenda for both of the countries. It has to be mentioned, 
that Belarus is still very dependent on Russia, and Lithuania, after a long period of strong dependence 
from Russia, is taking measures to reduce dependency, and now the European Union has strong 
influence for the Lithuania’s energy policy and its legislation. 
While talking about Belarus energy policy, according to A. Zaborovskiy (2011, p. 31), there are 
three main policy areas such as improving energy efficiency, reducing energy dependence and insuring 
gas transit to the EU. As mentioned before, Belarus has close ties with Russia. This development of 
cooperation between Belarus and Russia started after three treaties were signed: on the Commonwealth 
of Russia and Belarus (1996), on the Union between Belarus and Russia (1997), and on the Creation of 
a Union State of Russia and Belarus (1999). The treaties provide agreements such as the creation of a 
customs union; a common energy market; a common market; and common pricing for energy 
resources. 
Although, in reference to A. Zaborovskiy (2011, p. 32), bilateral relations between Russia and 
Belarus in the energy sphere had worsened because the Belarusian government decided to revise its 
strategy for domestic energy sector development. For this reason in the beginning of 2007 Russia quit 
from the new deal and Gazprom declared plans to increase gas prices for Belarus to the European 
level. “Russia’s unilateral withdrawal from the principles of a common market and its contradictory 
positions on oil and gas transit through Belarus in 2004, 2006, 2007 and 2009 resulted in considerable 
changes to both Russia’s strategy for the development of oil and gas export infrastructure and 
Belarus’s energy strategy” (Zaborovskiy, 2011, p. 32). 
In October 2007, Belarus has approved the new concept of energy security and the state 
programme. Earlier documents were approved in 2005. However, according to the official point of 
view, the old concept is outdated because of the changed parameters of cooperation between Belarus 
and Russia in the field of energy. The country needed to reduce energy dependence on Russia, and the 
new instruments are designed to respond to new challenges (Rakava, 2010). Documents were 
approved such as (Zaborovskiy, 2011): the State Program for the Belarusian Energy System 
Modernization, the Concept of the Energy Security of the Republic of Belarus and the Directive N 3. 
They call for diversifying supply, improving efficiency and increasing use of domestic resources. “The 
key issues in Directive N 3 and the Strategy of Energy Security of Belarus are greater security of 
supply, reduced dependence on imports, in particular, from Russia, and exploitation of all possible 
advantages of Belarus’s geopolitical situation as an energy transit country connecting Russia and the 
EU. These key issues take on greater significance when considering Russia’s treatment of the Ukraine 
in 2005-2006 and 2008-2009. Russia limited supplies of natural gas to the Ukrainian gas transportation 
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system which in turn caused considerable havoc for EU gas supplies” (Zaborovskiy, 2011, p. 32). 
Under these circumstances, with inadequate local resources, it is reasonable to expect that Belarus 
could take measures like construction of a nuclear power plant or a coal plant. Although, “enhancing 
energy security through the construction of a nuclear power plant by a Russian contractor, and using 
Russian credit resources, does not seem to be a viable option” (Rakava, 2010). 
Considering energy efficiency strategy, in reference to Energy Charter Secretariat (2013, p. 14), 
the current energy and energy efficiency policy and strategy of Belarus for the period of 2020 aims at 
restructuring and modernising the national economy based on energy efficient technologies. Some of 
the main goals have been set such as reduction in the energy intensity of GDP by 60% in 2020, 
compared with 2005 level. Also, share of domestic energy resources in the energy balance at least 32% 
in 2020. In order to achieve these goals, measures have been taken, for example, introduction of 
National Energy Saving Programme for 2011-2015; National Programme of Converting Boiler Houses 
into Mini-CHPs (mini-Combined Heat and Power plants) for 2007-2010; Programme of Constructing 
Biogas-Based Generation Facilities for 2010-2015; State Programme of Constructing Generation 
Facilities Using Local Fuels Sources for 2010-2015 etc. The construction of a nuclear power plant of 
2,340 MW by 2020 is also foreseen in the Belarusian Government’s plans. Relevant legislation is in 
force: Law of the Republic of Belarus (RB) dated 15 July 1998 No. 190-3 on Energy Saving; Law of 
RB dated 30 July 2008 No. 426-3 On Use of Nuclear Power; the Rules of Heat Use etc. 
Measures on climate action are additionally significant in order to achieve energy policy goals. 
“The Republic of Belarus submitted its intended nationally determined contributions in 2015, 
communicating its intention to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% by 2030 below 1990 
level” (OECD, 2016, p. 2). According to OECD country study (2016, p. 2), “Belarus has already 
developed a range of legal and policy frameworks for addressing issues concerning climate change and 
a wider set of sustainable development agenda”. These are, for example, the State Programme on 
Mitigation Actions in 2013–2020; the National Strategy for Sustainable Development in the Republic 
of Belarus until 2030; and the Concept of the Law on Climate Protection. In reference to International 
Energy Agency (2016), there are various types’ of legislation in force which helps to achieve goals 
that are set in accordance with climate change and sustainable development. For instance: tax relief for 
renewable energy investors; Law on Renewable Energy Sources; resolution on Feed-in Tariffs for 
electricity generated from renewable energy sources; and National Program of Local and Renewable 
Energy Sources Development. 
Speaking about the EU and Lithuania, for a start main points of the European Union energy 
policy will be noted. Furthermore, Lithuanian energy policy in relation with the EU policy will be 
25 
 
reviewed. Although energy related matters have been important during the integration process of the 
EU itself, as a separate policy area it is quite a new phenomenon. The most significant EU energy 
policy initiatives started to develop since 2005-2006, and now the EU energy policy is important 
object which receives attention in various meetings on the EU level (Vaičiūnas, 2009). According to 
D. Helm (Helm, 2012), as for the EU energy policy, there are three distinct parts: the internal energy 
market, climate change, and security of supply. The same parts will be distinguished in the energy 
policy review; additionally the EU energy policy and its relation with nuclear energy will be reviewed. 
First of all, the internal market is closely related with two other firm EU policies – the single 
European Market and competition policy. In this case, liberalization of markets is at the core (Buchan, 
2015). It started with a first package of directives. This package “requires MS to open access to all 
third parties to grids in non-discriminatory and transparent manner” (Urbanavicius, 2017). This 
“allowed the option of ‘regulated’ third-party access to networks on the basis of tariffs approved by 
national regulators” (Buchan, 2015). Afterwards followed a second package of open-access directives. 
The main point is that it “requires MS to legally unbundle energy transmission from generation” 
(Urbanavicius, 2017). It also “required every member state to have a national energy regulator 
(Buchan, 2015). With reference to D. Buchan (2015), powers of national regulators were weakened to 
a minimum and they had to coordinate with each other and to coordinate with the Commission. 
Finally, the third package came into force and this set of directives “requires MS to unbundle 
ownership” (Urbanavicius, 2017). “It harmonised up the powers of national regulators. More 
importantly, it upgraded European Regulators' Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG) in Agency for 
the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) (Regulation 713/2009), which has, for the first time, 
the power to take and enforce binding decisions” (Buchan, 2015). 
According to International Energy Agency (2017), definition of energy security is “the 
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”. EU actions in this case are to 
“ensure sources of supply from third countries, support energy infrastructure in and between Member 
States, ensure security of gas storage and reduce energy consumption” (Urbanavicius, 2017). The EU 
has legislated in the field throughout the history, but some key legislation is “for instance, the 2004 
Gas Security Directive, the 2005 Electricity Security Directive, the 2010 Gas Security of Supply 
Regulation, and the establishment in 2011 of the Gas Coordination Group” etc. (Buchan, 2015). Some 
of the latest measures are Energy Security Strategy released in 2014 by the European Commission 
(2017). This includes certain short-term and long term measures in order to achieve energy security. It 
also can be noted that this field of energy policy gained its significance after the enlargement in 2004 
as post-Soviet bloc countries had experienced issues related with energy security, and now this field 
gained reasonable importance. 
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With reference to D. Buchan (2015), the third pillar of the EU energy policy, which is climate 
change, probably is the one to which the EU paid the biggest attention. EU policy-makers think 
themselves as architects in developing both international and domestic measures to fight climate 
change. According to J. Urbanavicius (2017), main EU actions in this field are “support for renewable 
energy is allowed by the EU law, MS may choose different support schemes, MS may cooperate in 
achieving these goals, EU sets common standards in the area of energy efficiency and energy savings, 
EU also sets environmental standards aimed at emissions reduction”. From a legal point of view, the 
most important are such measures as the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) by the European 
Commission (2017) with intention “to reduce its emission of man-made greenhouse gases”. It is also 
important to mention 2020 Energy Strategy. “By 2020, the EU aims to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 20%, increase the share of renewable energy to at least 20% of consumption, and 
achieve energy savings of 20% or more. All EU countries must also achieve a 10% share of renewable 
energy in their transport sector” (Energy, 2017). Some main points (Urbanavicius, 2017) are that goals 
are compared with 1990 level, implemented by setting national targets, become 40-27-27 targets by 
2030, further discussions on post-2050 targets. 
Nuclear energy is important since the very start of the European Union itself, as together with 
Rome treaty in 1957 the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was established. Primary 
goal of the community was to ensure peaceful use of atomic energy. At this moment, European 
Commission (EC) (2017) distinguishes 5 separate areas for the nuclear energy agenda: nuclear safety, 
radioactive waste and spent fuel, radiation protection, decommissioning of nuclear facilities and 
safeguards to avoid misuse. Safe use of nuclear power is at the core. Nuclear energy plays a significant 
role in the EU, according to the EC (2017) together with more than 140 power reactors in the 
European Union, producing more than 25% of all the EU electricity. The nuclear industry contributes 
to EU energy objectives, such as achieving a viable and diverse energy mix; limiting CO2 emissions; 
maintaining security of energy supply and energy independence; promoting economic development 
and employment (EC, 2016). For this reason, EU invests into nuclear energy sphere. For example, in 
2007 EU’s Sustainable Nuclear Energy Technology Platform has been set up. „The overall goal is to 
support technological development for enhancing safe and competitive nuclear fission in a sustainable 
energy mix, as part of the EU’s SET-Plan (Strategic Energy Technology Plan)” (Sepielli, 2013). 
Although after Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster nuclear safety became more important. In 2011 
and 2012 stress tests have been performed for all of the EU’s nuclear power plants. Some key 
legislation as Nuclear Safety directive 2009 saw amendment in 2014 in favour for stricter nuclear 
safety standards (EC, 2017). 
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As for Lithuanian energy policy, after the accession to the European Union in 2004, Lithuania’s 
energy policy became closely related with EU’s energy policy, as EU had significant legislative power 
for Lithuania in the field. For this reason, in order to review Lithuania’s energy policy three parts will 
be distinguished, as in the EU energy policy, such as internal energy market, energy security, and 
climate change. In the beginning, it is important to mention, that Lithuania, during its accession 
negotiations agreed to decommission Ignalina nuclear power plant, together with Council Regulation 
(EU) No 1369/2013 of 13 December 2013 on Union support for the nuclear decommissioning 
assistance programme in Lithuania, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1990/2006. According to 
European Commission (2017), this has been done following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, as EU 
decided that so-called High Power Channel Type Reactors and first-generation Soviet-designed 
nuclear reactors would have to be shut down, for safety reasons. 
Despite the closure of Ignalina nuclear power plant Lithuanian politicians were in favour for the 
development of nuclear energy. The main reason to favour nuclear energy was energy security as 
Lithuania was strongly dependent from Russia for energy imports. Discussions about building new 
nuclear power plant after the closure of the old one started in 2002 in Lithuanian Parliament, and 
official document was sign meaning start of implementing the project in 2006 (vae, 2017). The project 
was gradually developed and it saw approval of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) by the 
Ministry of Environment, also regional partners have been found and main investor (WNA, 2017). 
Although a non-binding referendum was held in 2012 which resulted in majority of voters rejecting the 
project implementation plan (VRK, 2012).  
In the field of internal energy market Lithuania faces some issues. According to EC (n.d.) 
“Lithuania’s electricity grid is still connected with and operates in a synchronous way with the Russian 
and Belarusian systems. Furthermore, the competitiveness of the power generation industry is affected 
by imports of cheap electricity from third countries, mainly Russia”. Although the Third Energy 
Package provisions has been successfully implemented by Lithuania. According to European 
Commission Single Market Progress Report for 2014 (2014, p. 2) “in the electricity sector, the 
ownership unbundling model was chosen for unbundling the state-owned TSO Litgrid AB, making use 
of the possibility provided for in Article 9(6) Electricity Directive to implement the ownership 
unbundling model by means of separate public bodies within the State”. In gas sector, Lietuvos Dujos 
AB was also unbundled, although “the planned implementation of ownership unbundling has been 
challenged by Gazprom (co-shareholder of Lietuvos Dujos AB and Amber Grid)”. Furthermore the 
Baltic Energy Market Integration Plant (BEMIP) has to be mentioned which aims at improving regions 
integration into the continental energy grid. 
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Energy security is the most important pillar for Lithuania, due to comparatively high dependence 
on Russia in energy sector. “Since independence, Lithuania’s energy policy has been focused on 
diversification” (Fraser, 2016). With reference to European Commission (n.d.) “as regards Energy 
Security, Lithuania has made recently visible progress in improving its electricity and gas 
infrastructure. In the gas sector, the LNG Terminal in Klaipeda has been put in operation in December 
2014 and the related gas pipeline, Klaipeda-Kursenai, was commissioned in November 2015. 
Furthermore, an agreement on the construction of a gas interconnector with Poland was reached in 
September 2015. In the electricity sector, two important interconnectors with Sweden (NordBalt) and 
with Poland (LitPol-Link) have been commissioned in 2015. As regards Energy Efficiency, further 
improving Lithuania’s energy efficiency will reduce long-term energy costs, and will strengthen 
energy security”. “After the shutdown of the Ignalina NPP, Lithuania has become an importer of 
electricity.  The above mentioned NordBalt link and LitPol Link are necessary to integrate Lithuania 
into a common European electricity market, thus contributing to a more reliable electricity supply, 
more stable prices and enhanced competition on the Lithuanian market” (EC, Single market progress 
report, 2014).  Lithuania paid biggest attention in energy security sector which helped to achieve 
significant results, though this sector is still of high priority for the country and receives considerable 
amount of support. 
 
Figure 2. Lithuania’s energy resources target in the final energy consumption, %. (LREM, 2017) 
In the Decarbonisation field Lithuania performs sufficiently regarding 2020 target for renewable 
energy as it already achieved its target in 2013. “On the basis of measures already in place, Lithuania 
is expected to meet its 2020 greenhouse emission target” (EC, n.d.) which is 20%. Lithuania has goals 
(Figure 2) to achieve 45% of renewable energy in its final energy consumption by 2030 and 80% by 
2050. Biggest share of renewable energy will be generated by wind power. 
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Figure 3. Energy intensity decrease forecast by 2050 in Lithuania, kgoe/1000eur. (LREM, 2017) 
Energy efficiency is also high on the agenda and the biggest attention will be paid to increase the 
efficiency for heating apartment buildings, moreover to raise energy efficiency for transport sector. 
Target is to reduce energy intensity (Figure 3) to EU average by 2030, and by 2.6 times by 2050. 
(LREM, 2017) At this moment energy efficiency politics in Lithuania is directed towards expensive 
measures that guarantees biggest energy saving potential, although not enough attention is paid to low-
cost yet comparatively limited energy saving and GHG emission reduction measures: voluntary 
agreements, energy efficiency requirements during procurement procedures and Green Purchasing. 
(Štreimikienė & Mikalauskienė, 2012) Furthermore with reference to European Commission in 
Lithuania “environmental taxes are very low, and there is remaining scope to reduce the high tax 
wedge for low income earners by shifting the tax burden to other sources less detrimental to growth” 
(EC, n.d.).  
1.4 Nuclear Safety and Security 
In a framework of this paper nuclear safety and security is significant topic. Belarus Astravets 
nuclear power plant received considerable amount of criticism in relation to nuclear safety and it is 
important to separate nuclear safety and security definitions and to specify what safety is in a frame of 
the research. Furthermore, existing safety assurance measures for BelNPP are reviewed. It will be 
performed by examining how Belarus and Lithuania are interrelated from a legal point of view. 
International organizations provide this framework although they have no legally binding power to 
guarantee full safety measures for its members. 
First of all, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 2017) defines nuclear safety as “the 
achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents and mitigation of accident 
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consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue radiation 
hazards”. It aims to ensure people and environmental protection against risks related to nuclear energy 
object. With reference to IAEA (2017) “safety concerns both risks under normal circumstances and 
risks as a consequence of incidents, as well as other possible direct consequences of a loss of control 
over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source of radiation. 
There are many different types of sources of radiation, and hence safety includes the safety of nuclear 
installations, radiation safety, the safety of radioactive waste management and safety in the transport of 
radioactive material; it does not include non-radiation-related aspects of safety”. 
“'Nuclear security' is the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, 
unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other 
radioactive substances or their associated facilities. The response element of the definition refers to 
those actions aimed at ‘reversing’ the immediate consequences of unauthorized access or actions (e.g. 
recovering material). Response to the radiological consequences that might ensue is considered part of 
safety” (IAEA, IAEA.com, 2017).  Nuclear security risks are such as nuclear proliferation and nuclear 
terrorism (Pakalniskis, 2015). Nuclear security is achieved through 5 main pillars: Policy, Law and 
Diplomacy; Education and Training; Science and Technology; Operations and Intelligence 
Capabilities; Real World Missions (UTK, 2017).  
According to IAEA (2017) “there is not an exact distinction between the general terms safety 
and security. In general, security is concerned with malicious or negligent actions by humans that 
could cause or threaten harm to other humans; safety is concerned with the broader issue of harm to 
humans (or the environment) from radiation, whatever the cause”. The exact interaction among 
security and safety rely on the background. In this paper nuclear safety is distinguished as the most 
relevant term due to its relation with nuclear energy production in a safe and peaceful manner. 
As for BelNPP essential principle exists at a global level according to which operator of the 
nuclear power plant is responsible for its safety. ”The national regulator is responsible for ensuring the 
plants are operated safely by the licensee, and that the design is approved” (WNA, 2016).  Belarus 
holds full responsibility for the safety of BelNPP and its implementation despite influence from 
contractor or other bodies. Also, “a second important concept is that a regulator’s mission is to protect 
people and the environment” (WNA, 2016). This kind of protection from negative consequences could 
be described by introducing a risk concept in which case “an activity is considered to be safe when its 
associated risks are being controlled to acceptable levels” (NAP, 2014, p. 233) It is important as 
“safety is considered to be an inviolable constraint and part of the social contract under which nuclear 
plants are allowed to operate” (NAP, 2014, p. 233). 
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Despite the fact that operator is fully responsible for the safe use of nuclear energy there are a 
number of international organizations that supports, coordinates and regalement’s the safe use of this 
type of energy, however they are not legally binding. In the context of BelNPP the most relevant are 
EU, IAEA together with Site and External Events Design (SEED) review, ESPOO Convention and 
Aarhus Convention. As for the EU it has legislated in the field for a reasonable amount of time 
together with EURATOM Treaty. Nuclear safety and security standards have been included in the 
legislation and it has relevant tasks as: “to establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of 
workers and of the general public and ensure that they are applied; to make certain that civil nuclear 
materials are not diverted to other (particularly military) purposes; to foster progress in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy by working with other countries and international organisations” (EUR-Lex, 
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), 2007). In accordance to 
cooperation with third countries in energy security field the EU in 2013 and in this case the European 
Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). The EU’s cooperation on nuclear safety with third countries has two main objectives (EC, 
2013):  
1. Promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture and implementation of the highest nuclear 
safety and security standards and radiation protection; 
2. Responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste, decommissioning and 
remediation of former nuclear sites and installations. 
In addition, Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC) is in place. In reference to 
European Commission (EC, 2017) “the geographical scope of the INSC extends to all third countries, 
but priority is given to accession and neighbouring countries. Via the INSC the following specific 
objectives are pursued: the promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture and implementation of the 
highest nuclear safety and radiation protection standards, and continuous improvement of nuclear 
safety; responsible and safe management of spent fuel and radioactive waste and remediation of former 
nuclear sites and installations; the establishment of frameworks and methodologies for the application 
of efficient and effective safeguards for nuclear material in third countries”. As Belarus is a 
neighbouring country for the EU it has higher importance in its agenda to cooperate in nuclear safety 
field implementation. Furthermore financial cooperation with non-EU countries on nuclear safety 
(2014–20) is functioning. Significant aim of this legislation is that it “allows for grants to non-EU 
countries with a view to maintaining the highest possible nuclear safety standards” (EUR-Lex, 2016). 
International Atomic Energy Agency has certain legal documents to ensure nuclear safety. 
Convention on Nuclear Safety (IAEA) is a “1994 International Atomic Energy Agency treaty that 
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governs safety rules at nuclear power plants in state parties to the Convention” (IAEA, 2017). Belarus 
has accession since 27 Jan 1999 (IAEA, 2017). “The Convention creates obligations on state parties to 
implement certain safety rules and standards at all civil facilities related to nuclear energy. These 
include issues of site selection; design and construction; operation and safety verification; and 
emergency preparedness” (IAEA, 2017). Moreover, Site and External Events Design Review Service 
(SEED) is one of the instruments by IAEA created to assist member states to implement nuclear 
security safety measures. “On official request from a Member State, SEED provides an independent 
review of site evaluation and safety design of a nuclear installation against the demands posed by 
external natural and human induced hazards, as well as internal ones” (Haddad, 2013). It consist of six 
modules: Review on Site and Design Safety Regulations; Review of the Site Selection Process; Site 
Evaluation Review; Environmental Impact Assessment Review; Site Monitoring Review; Safety 
Review of Structures, Systems and Components against External Hazards (Haddad, 2013). A key point 
is that this review is optional and selected modules by a hosting country can be inspected. 
UNECE Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context is 
one of the tools that can help to ensure nuclear safety and is relevant in the context of this research. 
“The Espoo (EIA) Convention sets out the obligation to assess the environmental impact of certain 
activities at an early stage of planning. Under the Convention states are obliged to notify and consult 
each other on all major projects under consideration that are likely to have a significant adverse 
environmental impact across boundaries” (UNECE, United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, 2017). BelNPP falls under the definition of a major project which can have significant 
influence for the environment and Lithuania is a country that would be affected by the project. 
The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters is important in the context of this paper as Lithuania 
criticized Belarus for violating this convention. 
The Convention (UNECE, 2017): 
• Links environmental rights and human rights 
• Acknowledges that we owe an obligation to future generations 
• Establishes that sustainable development can be achieved only through the involvement 
of all stakeholders 
• Links government accountability and environmental protection 
• Focuses on interactions between the public and public authorities in a democratic context. 
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Neighbouring countries of the state constructing nuclear power plant can legislate to ensure nuclear 
safety. As for BelNPP Lithuania legislated and has approved two domestic laws to influence 
construction of the nuclear power plant. The first law established safety measures by banning the 
possibility to import electricity from countries that have unsafe nuclear power plants in operation or 
the use of domestic energy infrastructure for the purpose of unsafe power plants (LRS, Lietuvos 
Respublikos Seimas, 2017). This also prevents energy produced in unsafe nuclear power plants to 
move into other markets through Lithuania like Poland, Scandinavian countries etc. Second law 
declares BelNPP a threat to Lithuanian national security, environment and human health (LRS, 2017). 
There are also measures by Poland to support nuclear security of BelNPP at least on a political agenda 
by boycotting Astravets energy (Baumgartner, 2017). These safety measures can be justified as there is 
additionally a recommendation by Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) that calls 
on the Government of Belarus to suspend the construction of the Astravets Nuclear Power Plant due to 
various violations (PACE, 2017). 
To conclude, three main theoretical perspectives have been used such as discursive institutionalism, 
agenda setting and issue framing, which explain how political discourses can be changed and adapted 
in order to achieve the desired approach towards the BelNPP. Belarus and Lithuania political 
institutions have reasons to use the so called framing in political discourses. Belarus ranks 127th 
according to the democracy index is (EIU, 2016), which shows that it faces issues with democracy. It 
is very likely to use framing for its discourse to achieve desired goals and to justify political actions. 
For example, although in Belarus energy policy reduction of energy dependence from Russia is one of 
the most important points, but due to close cooperation with Russia regarding BelNPP project there are 
doubts that dependency will decrease, so there can be more reasons behind the project that are framed. 
As for Lithuania, BelNPP could mean possibility to import cheap energy from Belarus, although 
energy dependence from Russia is high on the agenda. This way, Lithuanian political institutions can 
frame issues in a negative way towards BelNPP to justify expensive investments in energy security 
field. There can be more reasons to explain why and how issues towards certain projects are framed, 
but it makes it important to research how this is done.  
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2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Political discourse analysis has been chosen as main methodological strategy for the empirical 
research. The methodology of content analysis is also adapted for the purposes of this research. 
Operationalization of “discourse” definition is important in order to perform discourse analysis, which 
is achieved by indicating main dimensions of the discourse analysis (Telešienė, 2006, p. 18): 
• Content: object of focus, theme or question, descriptive and evaluative statements on the 
object; 
• Discourse actors and discourse context (discourse actors are often analysed as a part of 
context). 
Content of the discourse includes various statements on the object of focus. Content is described 
through themes, which are developed in texts. Themes define what the discourse is about, they 
organize the process of discourse and provide with the most important information about the discourse. 
Furthermore there is more than a single approach to a discourse context. Firstly discourse is 
understood as social, political, cultural and historical structures where the discourse is happening. Also 
context in discourse analysis is understood as direct situation of the discourse process, where the 
situation of the discourse is commonly being described, discourse actors are named, as well as their 
relation. This allows to explain variety of language use, situational differences (RINOVA, 2009). As 
for content analysis, it is “a research technique used to make replicable and valid inferences by 
interpreting and coding textual material” (UoG, 2012). It is also important to note that “by 
systematically evaluating texts, qualitative data can be converted into quantitative data” (UoG, 2012). 
For a research purpose texts were interpreted and coded by codes having attributed value to them. 
Main sources of information are communicative political discourse texts as produced by 
Belarusian and Lithuanian Parliaments and Governments. Those texts are treated as institutional 
products and do not represent directly or solely the views of separate political actors, but rather 
represent institutional approach towards the topic. The texts are produced mostly as news or press 
releases, thus are filtered, edited and directed towards general public audiences. Thus research results 
will speak of the discursively controlled and consciously constructed political institutional positions on 
Astravets nuclear power plant related issues. 
In Lithuania’s case, official news and press releases from Parliament and Government websites 
(lrs.lt and lrv.lt) will be analysed. In Belarus case, news and press releases from official governmental 
Belarus website has been chosen (belarus.by). The latter has a bigger amount of material available on 
the website, so the sampling strategy has been developed. Criteria sampling was conducted and one of 
the main criteria was that news were communicated by political actors, which represents Belarus 
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Parliament and Government. Section ‘Press centre’ in the website was used to gather information. This 
included: News and Events in Belarus, Speeches and Interviews and Latest press releases. Same actors 
have been picked up in Lithuania’s case. Differences between the sources have occurred, as there are 
no news from Belarus Parliament or Government websites available in English language, so official 
website of Belarus has been the closest source in order to see what was communicated by Belarus 
politicians. At the same time, Lithuania does not have its one single official governmental website, so 
lrs.lt and lrv.lt represents what is being communicated by these institutions. Belarus.by website has an 
important feature, as significant majority of its news is from the Belarusian Telegraph Agency 
(BelTA). According to the website, ‘BelTA has been the country’s official news agency and is the 
most respected source of up-to-the-minute news about Belarus supreme authorities (BelTA)’. There is 
no equivalent to BelTa in Lithuania, as it is a primary source of its own news, although official 
Lithuania’s news agency LRT also publishes news from private news sources; additionally BelTa 
represents ‘Belarus supreme authorities’. The texts were sampled from the period of 2012-2017. 2012 
marks the rise of the discourse. The end date of the sampling period is 04/11/2017 as this marks the 
start of the data gathering. 
In the second stage of purposive criterion sampling, the relevant texts were sampled out of the 
totality of news and press releases found in the lrs.lt, lrv.lt and Belarus.by for the period 2012-2017. In 
order to find relevant news on Astravets nuclear power plant, from Belarus.by website, the search 
option has been used, with search phrase ‘Ostrovets nuclear power plant’, which represents most 
relevant keywords for the topic. Word ‘Ostrovets’ has been used for Belarus news search, as it is 
commonly used in Belarus news, although in other news websites word ‘Astravets’ could be met. 
News messages were separated, which included Belarus Parliament or Government actors 
communicating on relevant topic. This has been achieved by reading available information, and 
sampling only those texts, that had a member of Parliament or Government communicating as a main 
actor, and if in the text topic is essentially about Astravets nuclear power plant. The same method has 
been used for Lithuanian communications. A total of 65 news and press releases were selected from 
Belarus communications. 
For sampling of Lithuanian texts out of totality of texts in lrv.lt and lrs.lt websites, equivavent 
phrase (as for a search of Belarus news) was used, which is ‚Astravo atominė elektrinė‘. Number of 
news and press releases found was not sufficient for a research purpose. So keyword Astrav* has been 
used for a search. Higher number of news was found, that fitted research. Additionally, to make 
Lithuanian political discourse comparable to that found of Belarus, websites of ministries have been 
examined using the same search method. Websites am.lt, enmin.lrv.lt and urm.lt, that stand for 
Ministry of Environment of the Republic of Lithuania, Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Foreigh 
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Affairs had communications available on the relevant topic. In other websites of the Lithuanian 
ministries were no communications available on related topic. In this case, as also in Belarus, news 
communicated by Parliament and Government members were sampled. A total of 67 press releases 
and news have been sampled. 
Table 1. List of codes used for the content analysis. 
 Codes family Codes Comments on coding 
technique 
Descriptive codes 
1. Heading  Row/rows coded 
2. Author Government members 
Parliament members 
Phrase coded 
3. Date  Phrase coded 
4. Emotional load Positive 
Negative 
Neutral 
Whole document coded/ OR 
Big part of document coded/ 
OR 
Paragraph coded 
Analytic codes 
5. Discourse 
actors 
Contractors 
Government 
Parliament 
International organizations and conventions 
European Union 
Lithuania 
Russia 
Japan 
Latvia 
Other countries 
Any mention in the text 
Paragraph coding 
(inductively generated list) 
6. Stakeholder 
relations 
Cooperative 
Conflicting 
Neutral 
Informing 
Other 
Paragraph coding 
7. Statements Descriptive statements 
Evaluative statements 
Paragraph coding 
8. Topics Technical aspects 
Environment 
Safety 
Politics 
Economy 
Information provision 
Paragraph coding 
9. Localization Local 
National 
Regional 
Global 
Paragraph coding 
10. Timeline Past 
Present 
Future 
Paragraph coding 
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Sampled news and press releases were coded, using open coding technique and followed the 
principles of abduction (deductive and inductive coding combined). Main codes (Table 1) cover topics 
of discourse actors, main discourse themes, timeline etc. The data for the research was coded using the 
same codes for both of the countries. Nvivo software for qualitative and mixed research methods has 
been used. Nvivo 11 Plus software has different tools for the analysis, but for the purposes of this 
research the main data analysis methods used included qualitative content analysis and quantitative 
content analysis: word frequency, cluster analysis, coding intensity (hierarchy charts), measuring 
relations between variables or measuring coding differences between texts (matrix coding). 
In the following part results of the analysis are presented by separating different codes families. 
Moreover, interrelation between selected codes families has been examined. Belarus and Lithuania’s 
texts were separated in order to perform descriptive content analysis.  
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3. THE RESULTS OF POLITICAL DISCOURSES CONTENT ANALYSIS 
In this part results of the political discourses content analysis of Belarus and Lithuania 
communications are presented. It is separated into five main distinct parts in accordance with codes 
families: Topics, Discourse Actors, Emotional Load, Localization, and Timeline. Questions are raised 
with a purpose to obtain the most important analysis results:  
• What are the main topics under which Astravets nuclear power plant is discussed in 
Belarusian and Lithuanian political discourses?  
• Which topics in political discourses are communicated similarly, and which differently? 
• What discourse actors are present (mentioned, referred or otherwise) in Belarusian and 
Lithuanian political discourses?  
• What type of stakeholder relations are mentioned when discourse actors are mentioned? 
• What are the emotional loads of Belarusian and Lithuanian political discourses on 
Astravets nuclear power plant?  
• What words are used in Belarusian/Lithuanian political discourses when speaking 
positively/negatively about BelNPP? 
• Which topics in the Belarusian and Lithuanian political discourses are discussed in 
positive/negative/neutral emotional load?  
• How the issues related to Astravets nuclear power plant are localized in the Belarusian 
and Lithuanian political discourses on BelNPP?  
• How issues related to Astravets nuclear power plant are chronologically presented in the 
Belarusian and Lithuanian political discourses? 
3.1 Main Topics of the Political Communicative Discourses on BelNPP 
In the beginning of the analysis the most common topics as pertaining to both Belarusian and 
Lithuanian communicative political discourses have been distinguished. During the analysis some of 
the most relevant topics found in the material were separated and coded as: “safety”, “politics”, 
“environment”, “technical aspects”, “economy”, “information provision”, and “other”. This raises the 
first question - what are the main topics under which Astravets nuclear power plant is discussed in 
Belarusian and Lithuanian political discourses? Quantitative analysis of the qualitative data has been 
performed and results are presented in the following picture. 
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Figure 4. Main topics on BelNPP in Belarusian and Lithuanian communicative discourses; hierarchy 
charts (categories compared by a number of coded references). 
Two hierarchy charts are provided (Figure 4) – one of them visually shows what the most 
common topics are in Belarusian discourse, and another one shows what the most common topics are 
in Lithuanian discourse. In Belarusian political discourse the main topics are “Safety” (N=70), 
“Technical aspects” (N=60), “Information provision” (N=51), “Environment” (N=30), “Economy” 
(N=29), “Other” (22) and “Politics” (N=8). In Lithuanian political discourses the main topics are 
“Safety” (N=134), “Politics” (N=71), “Environment” (N=59), “Information provision” (N=35), 
“Technical aspects” (N=28), “Economy” (N=21) and “Other” (N=14). Comparing the two charts, 
“Safety” is among the most pronounced topics in both of the discourses. Secondly, topic on “Technical 
aspects” is very much pronounced in Belarus case, although this topic is less manifest in Lithuanian 
discourse, where topic “Politics” is more pronounced. In Belarusian discourse “Information provision” 
and “Environment” are also relevant topics. For Lithuania “Environment” is more important, and 
“Information provision” follows. 
Original excerpts of the main topics are presented in Table 2. It provides with examples of the 
content being created in the two political discourses. Typical excerpts are presented. 
Table 2. Main topics of communicative political discourses on Astravets Nuclear Power Plant; original 
excerpts. 
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Code family: 
Topics 
Original excerpts 
 
Economy “Belarus’ economy will benefit from the nuclear power plant in Ostrovets…” (BY5)* 
“All this fuss regarding our project is nothing but Lithuania’s attempt to defend its 
economic interests…” (BY47) 
“This geopolitical, economically unjustified project poses a threat to national security.” 
(LT48) 
Environment “The environment around the Belarusian nuclear power plant construction site has been 
constantly monitored since 2009” (BY14) 
“This was enough to fulfil the requirements of the Espoo Convention” (BY35) 
“The official is confident that the construction of the nuclear power plant in Belarus will 
have a positive impact on the environmental situation in general and on the development of such 
important sectors as energy…” (BY22) 
“There are two essential problems – power plant is being built right near the border of 
Lithuania, near Vilnius. Second problem is that already could be seen opacity, non-cooperation, 
information not being shared, Espoo Convention violations.” (LT6) 
“Espoo and Aarhus Conventions are very important instruments, which helped to reveal for 
the international community  Astravets nuclear power plant environmental and nuclear safety 
issues” (LT64) 
Information 
provision 
“We are open to everyone in what concerns the construction of the nuclear power plant. 
Even the smallest details on the project are available in the information centre in Ostrovets. We are 
absolutely open for our neighbours regarding the NPP construction project…” (BY3) 
“Those who are interested in any information about the plant can get it easily” (BY24) 
“In the nuclear power plant being built not a single accident has occurred, we receive 
information about the accidents much later and more commonly from Belarus opposition actors, 
but not from official institutions.” (LT3) 
Other “Many countries take a live interest in our experience, because Rosatom, which is the 
general contractor, praises the successful organization of the work both during the preparatory 
period and the construction period…” (BY12) 
Politics “We gave the answers to all the questions from our neighbour, but the issue has grown into 
a political one…” (BY15) 
“We also discussed political cooperation. We talked over our relations with the European 
Union and Lithuania in the area.” (BY59) 
“…This is also a clear signal for Russia, because Astravets nuclear power plant is Russia’s 
geopolitical project, with bad intentions towards Lithuania.” (LT2) 
“Without getting involved into internal social democrats party affairs, I can only be glad, 
that this kind of prime ministers position is not Ministers of Forreign affairs Lino Linkeviciaus 
position.” (LT9) 
Safety “Belarus is building the safest and most reliable nuclear power plant there is…” (BY36) 
“The preliminary results of the comprehensive inspection suggest that the safety 
requirements related to the construction of the Belarusian nuclear power plant are fulfilled in 
general…” (BY44) 
“Belarus nuclear power plant construction in Astravets is still the main topic on nuclear 
security in the region. During the meeting great concerns were expressed about the nuclear safety, 
constantly reoccurring incidents in Astravets nuclear power plant…” (LT14) 
“These irresponsible statements from one of the heads of the Republic of Lithuania 
damages Lithuania’s concerns. The main concern of Lithuania is to seek that Astravets nuclear 
power plant would never be built, because under current circumstances to make sure that it would 
be safe is impossible…” (LT4) 
Technical 
aspects 
“In his words, Belarus has chosen the most reliable design AES-2006 of the three-plus 
generation to build its own nuclear power plant…” (BY9) 
“A technology process needs clearly defined time frames, therefore, everything goes on in 
strict compliance with technological requirements. We have an entire quality control system in 
place and regulating bodies work…” (BY21) 
“… Lithuania can achieve this in two ways: or to disconnect from Russian BRELL system 
and switch to continental energy system, or while temporary being still in BRELL, but at the 
border constructing so called Phase shift equipment’s, which would protect Lithuania’s energy 
market from energy flows from Russia and Belarus.” (LT13) 
 
 
41 
 
Furthermore, cluster analysis has been performed. The technique allows to display patterns in 
order to discover how similar words are used between the categories. It is assumed that subjects 
perceived by discourse actors as similar or related are communicated by similar words. A question is 
raised – which topics in political discourses are communicated similarly, and which differently? 
Cluster analysis for Belarusian and Lithuanian texts was performed separately. Cluster analysis results 
are presented in the following figure (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 5. Cluster analysis of main topics within Lithuanian and Belarusian discourses (categories grouped 
by words similarities; Sørensen coefficient applied). 
In Belarusian communicative political discourse (Figure 5) topics “Environment” and “Safety” 
fall within same cluster, because they use similar wording. Other topics are not constructed using 
significantly similar words. As an example of how “Environment” and “Safety” topics are constructed 
by using similar words a typical quote is specified: “According to the source, the design documents for 
building the Belarusian nuclear power plant have been approved by state environmental experts. 
During design and survey work the possible environmental impact of the future nuclear power plant 
was evaluated. All the necessary surveys and procedures were completed. Belarus is interested in the 
safe and reliable operation of its nuclear power plant like no other country…” (BY9).  It appears that 
both “Environment” and “Safety” topics are closely related in the discourse as they are used in a 
similar context, when explanation of the construction of the power plant is provided. 
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In Lithuania’s communicative political discourse (Figure 3), topics “Safety” and “Politics” fall 
within the same cluster, and topics “Environment” and “Information provision” form another cluster. 
Other codes have no significant words similarities. As for “Safety” and “Politics”, a typical quote 
example is: “Political parties signed an agreement by which committed to unanimously support project 
concerning energy boycott from unsafe power plants from the third countries. This is political 
Lithuania’s signal for Belarus that Lithuania will not buy unsafe energy, yet it is naïve to expect, that it 
will stop the construction…” (LT4). Political discourse on topics “Safety” and “Politics” has been 
constructed using similar words as there are reasonable amount of political communication between 
the political actors and institutions inside the Lithuania regarding this matter. For topics 
“Environment” and “Information provision” typical quote is provided: “Belarus does not follow Espoo 
Convention requirements and still have not answered many times asked questions by Lithuania about 
nuclear power plant safety and possible effect on our countries environment and residents…” (LT50). 
This illustrates significant amount of communications where Lithuania is arguing about the lack of 
information being provided by Belarus about the environmental impact by the BelNPP which are also 
related with certain international conventions. 
3.2 Main Discourse Actors 
In this part of the analysis codes family “Discourse actors” is used. It consists of actors: Belarus 
(used for coding only in Lithuania’s texts), Contractors, European Union, Government, International 
organizations and conventions, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania (used for coding only in Belarus texts), Other 
countries, Parliament, and Russia. Analysis is continued by employing analysis tool called Matrix 
coding. It allows different codes families or sources to be compared. Belarus and Lithuania sources 
were compared using codes family “Discourse actors” which allows to answer question - what 
discourse actors are present (mentioned, referred or otherwise) in Belarusian and Lithuanian political 
discourses? Data is provided in the table 3. 
The discourse actors mentioned in Belarusian political discourse (Table 3) are: “International 
organizations and conventions” (N=88), “Lithuania” (N=64), “Russia” (N=30), “Government” (N=19), 
“European Union” (N=16) and “Other countries” (N=16), “Contractors” (N=15), “Japan” (N=5), 
“Latvia” (N=2); “Parliament” has not been mentioned. In Lithuania these are: “Belarus” (N=169), 
“International organizations and conventions” (N=95), “Government” (N=88), “European Union” 
(N=69), “Parliament” (N=47), “Russia” (N=24), “Other countries” (N=23), “Latvia” (N=5), 
“Contractors” (N=4), “Japan” has not been mentioned. 
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Table 3. Discourse actors as mentioned in Belarusian and Lithuanian communicative political discourses; 
n of coded references (total references in Belarusian texts N=255, total references in Lithuanian texts N=524; 
Belarusian texts coded N=65, Lithuanian texts coded N=67. 
Discourse actors: A : Belarusian texts B : Lithuanian texts 
1 : Belarus 
 
- 
 
169 
2 : Contractors 
 
15 
 
4 
3 : European Union 
 
16 
 
69 
4 : Government 
 
19 
 
88 
5 : International organizations and 
conventions 
 
88 
 
95 
6 : Japan 
 
5 
 
0 
7 : Latvia 
 
2 
 
5 
8 : Lithuania 
 
64 
 
- 
9 : Other countries 
 
16 
 
23 
10 : Parliament 
 
0 
 
47 
11 : Russia 
 
30 
 
24 
 
The discourse actors mentioned in Belarusian political discourse (Table 3) are: “International 
organizations and conventions” (N=88), “Lithuania” (N=64), “Russia” (N=30), “Government” (N=19), 
“European Union” (N=16) and “Other countries” (N=16), “Contractors” (N=15), “Japan” (N=5), 
“Latvia” (N=2); “Parliament” has not been mentioned. In Lithuania these are: “Belarus” (N=169), 
“International organizations and conventions” (N=95), “Government” (N=88), “European Union” 
(N=69), “Parliament” (N=47), “Russia” (N=24), “Other countries” (N=23), “Latvia” (N=5), 
“Contractors” (N=4), “Japan” has not been mentioned. 
Discourse actors “International organizations and conventions” and “Other countries” has been 
coded in a broad way, connecting all of the international organisations in one code, and respectively all 
of the other countries into one code. In order to identify what type of material does these two codes 
families contain the relevant political discourse actors has been separated. Information is provided in 
two tables below, one for “International organizations” and another for “Other countries”. 
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Table 4. International organizations and conventions as discourse actors; n of coded references (total of 
references in Belarusian texts N=88, total of references in Lithuanian texts N=95; Belarusian texts coded N=65, 
Lithuanian texts coded N=67). 
International organizations and 
conventions: 
Belarusian texts: Lithuanian texts: 
IAEA 66 29 
IAEA SEED 10 14 
Espoo Convention 11 63 
WANO 7 - 
United Nations (Nuclear Safety 
Convention) 
1 16 
Aarhus Convention - 15 
 
Six international organizations and conventions have been distinguished (Table 4) the most 
commonly used in Belarus and Lithuania’s political discourses such as: IAEA, IAEA SEED, Espoo 
Convention, WANO, United Nations (Nuclear safety Convention), and Aarhus Convention. IAEA and 
IAEA SEED have been separated as in the discourses SEED mission is being used also separately 
from the IAEA. United Nations have been usually mentioned in a context of Nuclear Safety 
Convention. Although Espoo and Aarhus conventions are related to the UN, but in the discourses they 
were distinct. Results are that in Belarus political discourse the most frequent international 
organizations and conventions are: IAEA (N=66), Espoo Convention (N=11), IAEA SEED (N=10), 
WANO (N=7), UN (N=1), Aarhus convention has not been mentioned. In Lithuania these are: Espoo 
Convention (N=63), IAEA (N=29), UN (N=16), Aarhus Convention (N=15), IAEA SEED (N=14), 
WANO has not been mentioned. 
It is noted that in Belarusian political discourse IAEA is the most often mentioned actor in 
comparison to other international organizations or conventions. In general, IAEA and Lithuania (Table 
3) are the most often mentioned discourse actors. Original excerpt will be used to provide an example 
in what context IAEA is being commonly mentioned. “In particular, Mikhail Milhadyuk noted that the 
IAEA is satisfied with the NPP construction progress and the observation of safety requirements. ‘The 
IAEA is interested in the training of the personnel of the nuclear power plant and in the project as 
such, namely our efforts to learn the Fukushima lessons and the safety systems we are using,’ he said. 
The deputy energy minister stressed that the IAEA cannot criticize the Belarusian side for the violation 
of regulations and recommendations.” (BY39) It is concluded that IAEA is distinct because of the 
45 
 
cooperation in the safety field. Safety and cooperative relation (Table 3 and Table 6) are essentially 
important in Belarusian political discourse. 
In Lithuania’s communicative political discourse Espoo Convention is most referred to. Original 
excerpt is provided to define the context of communication regarding Espoo Convention: “Seimas 
member reminded, that even this year on April implementation committee of the United Nations 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (known as Espoo) convention in 
Geneva, constituted, that Belarus violated Espoo Convention, by hiding prepared Environmental 
Impact Assesment documentation and by not providing real possibility for Lithuanian society to 
participate in this process as well as not properly informing about the state’s decision regarding the site 
for the construction for Astravets nuclear power plant.” (LT18) This illustrates that Espoo convention 
is being communicated as the main tool which can influence construction of the BelNPP. It is also 
related with one of the main issue in the discourse, a lack of information being provided by Belarus. 
Table 5. Other countries as discourse actors; n of coded references (total of references in Belarusian texts 
N=16, total of references in Lithuanian texts N=23; Belarusian texts coded N=65, Lithuanian texts coded 
N=67). 
Other countries: Belarus: Lithuania: 
Poland 4 18 
Estonia - 5 
Finland 2 5 
Ukraine 5 4 
Sweden - 3 
Germany 3 1 
France 3 - 
United Kingdom 4 - 
Hungary 4 - 
 
Other countries the most often mentioned in communicative political discourses in Belarus and 
Lithuania were obtained. Limited number of other countries will be indicated as there were a 
significant amount of the countries mentioned a single time in various contexts. The most frequently 
mentioned other countries for Belarus are: Ukraine (N=5), Poland (N=4) and United Kingdom (N=4) 
along with Hungary (N=4), Germany (N=3) and France (N=3), Finland (N=2). For Lithuania: Poland 
(N=18), Estonia (N=5) and Finland (N=5), Ukraine (N=4), Sweden (N=3), Germany (N=1). 
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To deepen analysis on discourse actors, Matrix coding has been performed including codes 
families of “Discourse actors” and “Stakeholder relations”. It shows in what kind of context discourse 
actors are mentioned as in conflicting, cooperative, informing or neutral relations. Question is asked – 
what type of stakeholder relations are mentioned when discourse actors are mentioned? Belarusian 
and Lithuanian cases were analysed separately. 
Table 6. Coding matrix of “Stakeholder relations” and “Discourse actors”; Belarusian texts (references 
N=245, texts N=65). 
Discourse actors: A : Conflicting B : Cooperative C : Informing D : Neutral 
1 : Contractors 
 
0 
 
10 
 
1 
 
3 
2 : European Union 
 
0 
 
15 
 
1 
 
0 
3 : Government 
 
0 
 
15 
 
2 
 
2 
4 : International 
organizations and 
conventions 
 
0 
 
72 
 
4 
 
3 
5 : Japan 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
 
2 
6 : Latvia 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
7 : Lithuania 
 
16 
 
24 
 
22 
 
5 
8 : Other countries 
 
0 
 
7 
 
5 
 
5 
9 : Parliament 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
10 : Russia 
 
0 
 
23 
 
1 
 
3 
 
To begin with a conflicting relation (Table 6), a single country Lithuania is mentioned in 
Belarusian political discourse together with conflicting relations. This seems to happen because of 
Lithuania’s negative approach towards BelNPP. Cooperative relation is seen especially common with 
international organizations and conventions, Lithuania and Russia. International organizations and 
conventions are often mentioned in cooperative relations as cooperation with them in nuclear security 
field is very important topic in Belarusian discourse. Although Lithuania is mentioned in the discourse 
as having conflicting relations, however cooperative relations with Lithuania are mentioned more 
often. This is due to Belarus communications on importance of cooperation with Lithuania regarding 
BelNPP issues. Russia is seen as having cooperative relation because of its involvement in the project. 
Lithuania is a dominant subject in political discourse by being frequently mentioned in informing 
relations. This shows how Lithuania is distinct from other discourse actors by being involved in 
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various aspects of the project. International organizations are distinct as having strongly cooperative 
relation. 
Table 7. Coding matrix of “Stakeholder relations” and “Discourse actors”; Lithuanian texts (references 
N=459, texts N=67). 
Discourse actors: 
A : Conflicting B : Cooperative C : Informing D : Neutral 
1 : Belarus 
 
109 
 
10 
 
13 
 
7 
2 : Contractors 
 
2 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1 
3 : European Union 
 
0 
 
52 
 
7 
 
0 
4 : Government 
 
25 
 
33 
 
18 
 
7 
5 : International 
organizations and 
conventions 
 
0 
 
69 
 
15 
 
1 
6 : Japan 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
7 : Latvia 
 
0 
 
4 
 
0 
 
1 
8 : Other countries 
 
4 
 
17 
 
2 
 
2 
9 : Parliament 
 
10 
 
20 
 
8 
 
3 
10 : Russia 
 
8 
 
5 
 
2 
 
4 
 
Describing conflicting relations in Lithuania’s political discourse, Belarus is a dominant actor. 
This can be explained by a strong Lithuania’s criticism towards BelNPP. Lithuania’s Government is 
also often mentioned in the discourse as having conflicting relations. This is because of Lithuania’s 
Parliament criticism for the Government regarding performance on BelNPP. As cooperative actors in 
Lithuania’s discourse are seen international organizations and conventions, EU and Government. 
These discourse actors are mentioned in a context of cooperation related with issue solving regarding 
BelNPP. Government is also seen as informing actor, which shows Governments involvement in 
various aspects regarding the Belarus nuclear power plant project. 
3.3 Emotional Load of Belarusian and Lithuanian Texts 
In this part of the analysis results on the emotional load in Belarus and Lithuania’s political 
discourses will be provided. It shows if issues in political discourses on BelNPP are constructed 
positively, neutrally or negatively. This helps to answer the question - what are the emotional loads of 
Belarusian and Lithuanian political discourses on Astravets nuclear power plant? Matrix coding has 
been used on Belarus and Lithuania sources together with codes family “Emotional load”. 
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Table 8. Emotional load of Belarusian and Lithuanian political discourses; n of coded references (total of 
references in Belarusian texts N=224, total of references in Lithuanian texts N=233; Belarusian texts coded 
N=65, Lithuanian texts coded N=67). 
 
A : Negative B : Neutral C : Positive 
1 : Belarus_news 
 
16 
 
108 
 
150 
2 : Lithuania_news 
 
133 
 
61 
 
39 
 
In Belarus political discourse on BelNPP positive emotional load dominates (N=150), although 
neutral emotional load is also frequent (N=108); negative emotional load (N=16) is not least frequent. 
In Lithuania’s political discourse negative emotional load dominates (N=133); neutral (N=61) and 
positive (N=39) emotional loads are less frequent. Original excerpts demonstrating typical wording of 
various emotional loads will be provided in the following table. 
Table 9. Original excerpts demonstrating emotional load from Belarusian and Lithuanian texts. 
Codes family: 
emotional load 
Original excerpts 
Negative “in fact, the society is being drawn into the campaign, into the hysteria against 
Belarus. For what?” (BY51) 
“L. Balsys in the current Ministries of Environment position sees 
interinstitutional miscommunication by the ruling governors”. (LT5) 
“Astravets nuclear power plant raises great threat for the citizens of the 
country, for their safety and health…” (LT7) 
Neutral “The intergovernmental agreement on building the Belarusian nuclear power 
plant that we signed back in 2012 stipulates that we can send spent nuclear 
fuel for processing [to Russia]. The agreement in principle has been signed. 
Working documents are being developed.” (BY11) 
“The provisions of this law will also be applied for Astravets nuclear power 
plant. We invite Latvia to join this initiative, by adopting relevant legislation. 
We also ask for Latvia’s support solving other questions, related with 
Astravets nuclear power plant, especially during the upcoming meeting of 
Espoo Convention Parties…” (LT1) 
Positive “All this is an alternative to hydrocarbons. Our decision to build the nuclear 
power plant was an absolutely correct and conscious one…” (BY5) 
For Lithuania it is important, that commissioner once again repeated, that 
Commission will pay great attention to make sure nuclear power plants being 
built in the EU neighbourhood would comply with highest safety standards, 
and testing during the most unfavourable conditions would comply with the 
EU requirements…” (LT62) 
 
In Belarus case, negative emotional load (Table 9) most of the times has been used in a context 
together with Lithuania. Neutral emotional load has been used significant amount of times as Belarus 
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Government provided explanations and details related to BelNPP. Positive emotional load has been 
used most of the times as BelNPP project seems to be very beneficial to Belarus, everything seems to 
be according to a plan and it faces no important issues. In Lithuania’s case, negative emotional load is 
being used while criticizing BelNPP project, which seems to be a threat, and also when Parliament 
criticizes Government, for not implementing proper measures against BelNPP. Neutral emotional load 
was used in cases where description was necessary, and positive emotional load usually has been used 
while communicating on success stories by Lithuanian political actors, which would have impact on 
BelNPP. 
To deepen analysis, Word Frequency Query will be used. This tool counts frequency of the 
words in texts and shows the most frequent ones. Similar words have been included into the count and 
have been indicated in the table. Belarus and Lithuania’s texts were separated. Some of the most 
frequent words have not been included into the count, for example Belarus, power, plant, Lithuania 
etc. as these are technical words related to the topic. Questions have been raised – what words are used 
in Belarusian political discourses when speaking positively about BelNPP? What words are used in 
Lithuanian political discourses when speaking negatively about BelNPP? 
Table 10. Word count for Belarusian texts excerpts coded with “positive emotional load”. 
Word Count Similar words 
Construction 244 Construction, constructive 
Safety 188 Safety 
IAEA 186 IAEA 
Project 184 Project, projects 
Minister 167 Minister, ministers 
Mikhail, Mikhadyuk 122 Mikhail, Mikhadyuk 
International 103 Internal, International 
Development 102 develop, developed, developing, 
development, developments 
Cooperation 96 cooperate, cooperated, cooperates, 
cooperating, cooperation 
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Table 11. Word count for Lithuanian texts excerpts coded with “negative emotional load”. 
Word Count Similar words 
Safety 263 safety 
Environment 149 Environment, environmental 
Europe 111 europe 
Conventions 111 Conventions, convention 
Minister 89 Minister, ministers 
Espoo 85 Espoo 
Construction 74 Construction, constructive 
Project 70 Project, projects 
2016 68 2016 
IAEA 65 IAEA 
 
The most frequently used words with a positive emotional load (Table 10) in Belarus political 
discourse were: construction, safety, IAEA, project, minister, Mikhail Mikhadyuk, international, 
development, and cooperation. The most frequently used words with a negative emotional load (Table 
11) in Lithuania’s political discourse were: safety, environment, Europe, conventions, minister, Espoo, 
construction, project, 2016, IAEA. Comparing previously presented tables, there are words that match: 
construction, safety, IAEA, project, minister. This indicates that certain topics in Belarus has been 
constructed positively, and the same topics in Lithuania – negatively. From Belarus political discourse, 
words “Mikhail Mikhadyuk” is noted that is Deputy Energy Minister of Belarus, who communicates 
on a BelNPP topic in particularly positive emotional load. In general, word “Safety” is significant as it 
is important in both of the discourses; although in Lithuanian discourse it is most frequently mentioned 
with negative emotional load, when in Belarus discourse it is most frequently mentioned with positive 
emotional load. 
In the following section Matrix coding tool has been used with a purpose to analyse how 
emotional load is distributed among topics. Codes families “Emotional load” and “Topics” were used. 
Belarusian and Lithuanian texts were separated. Question is raised – which topics in the Belarusian 
and Lithuanian political discourses are discussed in positive/negative/neutral emotional load? 
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Table 12. Coding matrix of “Emotional load” and “Main topics” in Belarusian texts; n of coded 
references (references N=237, texts N=65). 
Topics: 
A : Negative B : Neutral C : Positive 
1 : Economy 
 
1 
 
12 
 
18 
2 : Environment 
 
2 
 
12 
 
15 
3 : Information provision 
 
5 
 
15 
 
31 
4 : Politics 
 
5 
 
3 
 
2 
5 : Safety 
 
0 
 
24 
 
40 
6 : Technical aspects 
 
0 
 
28 
 
24 
 
In Belarus political discourse topics on BelNPP (Table 12): economy, environment, information 
provision, safety have been constructed in a more positive emotional load. Topic “Technical aspects” 
has been constructed in mostly neutral emotional load. Topics “Information provision” and “Safety” 
are distinguished as they are mostly positive, also “Technical aspects” as it is similarly positive as well 
as neutral and has notable amount of codes used. Original excerpts for a better examination of these 
topics are presented. 
Table 13. Original excerpts demonstrating wording of emotional load on topics in Belarusian texts. 
Topics Original excerpts 
Information provision “We are open to everyone in what concerns the construction of the nuclear 
power plant. Even the smallest details on the project are available in the information 
center in Ostrovets. We are absolutely open for our neighbours regarding the NPP 
construction project…” (BY3) 
“Those who are interested in any information about the plant can get it 
easily…” (BY24) 
Safety “The design of the Belarusian nuclear power plant is the most advanced and safest in 
the world today…” (BY38) 
“The position of Belarus and the country’s voluntary adherence to the program 
confirms the country’s readiness to do whatever is necessary to ensure that the NPP 
project is maximum compliant with all safety standards…” (BY54) 
Technical aspects “We expect the new reactor pressure vessel to be delivered by the end of the year. It 
will be put in place in spring 2017. Thus, we expect the power-generating unit to 
commission in 2019…” (BY16) 
“speaking about equipment deliveries, the Energy Minister assured that all the issues 
are addressed in a timely manner. The Russian state corporation Rosatom guarantees 
the delivery of the most reliable equipment. There are no doubts that the supplied 
components meet all the quality and safety requirements.” (BY34) 
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Topic “Information provision” (Table 13) in Belarus discourse is frequently used positively as 
there is considerable amount of communications that informs about the high level of Belarus 
cooperation in providing other parties with information in an open and transparent approach. Belarus 
communicates in its discourse on topic “Safety” in a positive way mostly by statements about the 
successful implementation of safety standards as well as about safe design of the power plant. Topic 
“Technical aspects” in political discourse is constructed in a mostly neutral approach as commonly 
technical features of the power plant is being described under the topic, without it being evaluated. 
Although, this topic is also notably positive, as some of the technical features are being described in a 
positive and beneficial way. 
Table 14. Coding matrix of “Emotional load” and “Main topics” in Lithuanian texts; n of coded 
references (references N=252, texts N=67). 
Topics: 
A : Negative B : Neutral C : Positive 
1 : Economy 
 
7 
 
3 
 
4 
2 : Environment 
 
27 
 
9 
 
3 
3 : Information provision 
 
16 
 
7 
 
2 
4 : Politics 
 
44 
 
10 
 
8 
5 : Safety 
 
54 
 
28 
 
14 
6 : Technical aspects 
 
7 
 
5 
 
4 
 
In Lithuanian political discourse topics on BelNPP (Table 13): economy, environment, 
information provision, politics, safety, and technical aspects have been constructed in mostly negative 
emotional load. Topics “Environment”, “Politics”, and “Safety” are distinguished as being constructed 
significantly negatively in the discourse. Original excerpts of the texts regarding the topics are 
presented in the following table in order to examine political discourse content. 
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Table 15. Original excerpts demonstrating wording of emotional load on topics in Lithuanian texts. 
Topics Original excerpts 
Environment “Lithuania expresses great concerns at an international level regarding nuclear safety, 
environmental protection and radiation safety issues, as well as constantly reoccurring 
incident in the Astravets nuclear power plant…” (LT65) 
“Minister states, that Belarus at this moment constructs Astravets nuclear power plant by 
strongly violating main international conventions – Espoo and Aarhus, which regalement’s 
cross-border environmental effects assessment…” (LT57) 
Politics “According to minister, if Belarus after receiving this information is not going to stop the 
construction of Astravets NPP, this will be one more signal, that project is based not on 
economical, but on geopolitical motives.” (LT61) 
“Signs of Governments unwillingness and inability to act could be perceived since the very 
beginning, when plans became clear of neighbouring countries dictator to construct near 
Vilnius experimental, nowhere else in the world operating Russian nuclear reactor.” (LT12) 
Safety “So fundamental nuclear safety requirements are already violated, therefore Lithuania cannot 
allow itself to be forced and to agree, that near Vilnius would be operating unsafe nuclear 
power plant.“ (LT8) 
“In the document it is stated that Belarus violated many international construction safety 
requirements, especially by choosing inappropriate and unsafe construction site…” (LT2) 
 
In Lithuania’s political discourse communications on the topic “Environment” are constructed in 
mostly negative way. It is related with Lithuania’s criticism towards Belarus by the latter failing to 
implement international legislation closely related with environment. Also topic “Environment” is 
related with safety, which also receives criticism in the discourse. Topic “Politics” is constructed 
mostly negatively by statements from Lithuania that criticises Belarus for making BelNPP a political 
object. Also, internal communications in the discourse on politics by Lithuania ‘s Parliament and 
Government members have been negative which were related with criticism towards each other 
regarding activity connected with BelNPP. Topic “Safety” has significantly negative emotional load as 
the most important issues related with BelNPP correlate with violations during the construction of the 
power plant. 
3.4 Discursive Localization of BelNPP Issues 
Next, analysis will be performed on how political discourses in Belarus and Lithuania are 
localized. Analysis tool Hierarchy Chart is used for this purpose, to examine codes family 
“Localization” which has been coded as: global, local, national, regional. This will help to answer the 
question - how the issues related to Astravets nuclear power plant are localized in the Belarusian and 
Lithuanian political discourses on BelNPP? 
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Figure 6. Localization on BelNPP in Belarusian and Lithuanian communicative political discourses; 
hierarchy charts (categories compared by a number of coded references). 
In Belarus political discourse on BelNPP issues are localized as national (N=123), regional 
(N=78), global (N=58), and local (N=41). In Lithuania’s political discourse issues are localized as 
regional (N=156), national (N= 87), global (N=68), and local (N=34). The most significant difference 
is that discourse in Belarus is being localized mainly at national and regional levels, though in 
Lithuania it is localized mainly at regional level, and after that follows national level. Global and local 
levels are not essentially distinguished. For a further analysis original excerpts are presented in the 
table below. 
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Table 16. Original excerpts on political discourses localization in Belarus and Lithuania. 
Localization Original excerpts 
Global “The information submitted by the Foreign Ministry of Lithuania after the 
meeting in Geneva is viewed by Belarus as pressure on the Implementation Committee 
for the Espoo Convention…” (BY53) 
“Ministry of Foreign Affairs Linas Linkevicius on the 4th of April in Vienna met 
International Atomic Energy Agency general director Yukiya Amano and expressed 
particular concerns due to serious nuclear safety violations during the construction of 
Astravets nuclear power plant.” (LT60) 
Local “Mikhail Mikhadyuk stressed that apart from the IAEA, Belarus also cooperates 
in nuclear safety with all parties concerned. For example, the country is an active 
participant of the Regulatory Cooperation Forum. Besides, the Nuclear and Radiation 
Safety Department of the Belarusian Emergencies Ministry (Gosatomnadzor) holds 
observer status in the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association and in the 
forum for cooperation of state regulatory bodies of countries that operate VVER-type 
power-generating units. Apart from that, the Belarusian nuclear power plant (BelNPP) is 
a member of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). The BelNPP is 
currently undergoing stress tests. The first stage of the tests will be completed by year-
end 2016.” (BY61) 
“It’s been a while when Austria’s scientist criticising Astravets nuclear power 
plant technological safety performed a model of the accident, according to which 
nuclear material would spread out and would reach not only Lithuania, but also 
neighbouring Poland, Czech Republic, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Norway. That’s why 
Astravets nuclear power plant construction should concern not only Lithuania…” 
(LT24) 
National “The Belarusian side should do as many operations as possible and should supply 
as much equipment as possible. We would like to create additional jobs so that our 
people could work…”(BY1) 
“According to L. Balsys, national agreement signed by seven political parties for 
common action regarding Astravets nuclear power plant issues is a political signal for 
Belarus, though more active measures are necessary.” (LT4) 
Regional “The Belarusian nuclear power plant construction project is open and transparent, 
Belarus Deputy Energy Minister Mikhail Mikhadyuk said in an interview to the 
Lithuanian newspaper Lietuvos Rytas…” (BY24) 
“Invitation for Lithuanian representatives to a discussion on Saturday in Belarus 
about Astravets nuclear power plant Seimas member and chairman of the Lithuanian 
Party of the Greens Linas Balsys is calling a try of the Belarusian Government to imitate 
compliance with the international agreements, with a purpose to avoid responsibility for 
Espoo Convention violations.” (LT18) 
 
Belarus discourse actors (Table 14) are communicating mostly on BelNPP as a national subject 
as this is internal matter, and secondly on a regional level because of important regional actors such as 
Lithuania, Russia etc. that are having influence to the project. In Lithuania’s political discourse this is 
firstly regional issue, as the main subject is Belarusian nuclear power plant and Belarus is regional 
actor, and because of Russia and Poland etc., which are regional actors that are having influence for 
the project. Secondly it is a national issue for Lithuania due to communications between Parliament 
and Government regarding the project. 
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3.5 Discursive Representations of the Chronological Aspects of BelNPP Related Issues 
Analysis is continued by using Hierarchy Chart with a codes family “Timeline”. This way it will 
be examined how political discourses in Belarus and Lithuania refer to timing when talking about 
BelNPP. Codes were selected as: future, past, and present. Question is raised - how issues related to 
Astravets nuclear power plant are chronologically presented in the Belarusian and Lithuanian 
political discourses? Belarusian and Lithuanian texts have been separated. Results are presented in a 
figure below. 
 
Figure 7. Chronological representations of BelNPP related issues in political discourses in Belarus and 
Lithuania; hierarchy charts (categories compared by a number of coded references). 
In Belarus political discourse issues regarding BelNPP are presented in: present time (N=184), 
past (N=119), and future (N=98). In Lithuania’s political discourse these issues are presented in: past 
time (N=195), present (N=148), and future (N=146). Comparing political discourses timeline between 
Belarus and Lithuania notable difference is that Belarus constructs it mainly as an issue of the present 
time, and Lithuanian discourse represents BelNPP as an issue of the past and the future. Furthermore, 
original excerpts will be provided, to deepen analysis on how issues related to BelNPP are presented 
chronologically in the discourses. 
Table 17. Original excerpts on the chronological representations of BelNPP related issues in political 
discourses in Belarus and Lithuania. 
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Timeline Original excerpts 
Future “Once the NPP is launched, 27-28% of electric power will be produced by the nuclear plant. 
This will help Belarus diversify its energy sources…” (BY5) 
“The first power-generating unit of the Belarusian nuclear power plant will be commissioned 
in 2019.” (BY16) 
“Lithuania is planning to agree with a measure which is offered by Espoo secretariat and to 
establish international group of expertise that would evaluate construction of the Astravets 
nuclear power plant and even not going to demand, that conventions Committee of 
Implementation would insist to stop the nuclear project, until it’s not going to receive 
Lithuania’s approval, what the spirit of convention provides.” (LT5) 
Past “An information center of the Belarusian nuclear power plant was opened in Ostrovets. More 
than 13.000 people have visited the center since it was opened.” (BY2) 
“Belarus would not have taken up such a decision if it had doubts regarding its objectivity 
and honesty in the implementation of the Convention…” (BY35) 
“In the document it is stated, that Belarus violated many international safety requirements 
regarding construction, especially because of choosing not suitable and unsafe construction 
site.” (LT2) 
“Personally myself I met IAEA general secretary two times, one time in Vilnius, another 
time in Vienna – during the meetings we guaranteed international support for our 
requirements…” (LT36) 
Present “At present out of the 32 subcontractors working to build the Belarusian nuclear power plant, 
27 ones are Belarusian…” (BY1) 
“Belarus invites Lithuania to jointly monitor the environmental situation in the area around 
the Belarusian nuclear power plant…” (BY35) 
“Together with the Energy Ministry, we are implementing a range of projects that lay the 
foundation for the development of this sector in general…” (BY60) 
“This is obvious Lithuania’s victory in the international organizations, Vilnius is being 
heard…” (LT2) 
“National security and people’s concerns are the most important. Lithuania’s position 
regarding Astravets nuclear power plant is clear and principled – Astravets NPP construction 
cannot be continued…” (LT43) 
 
In Belarusian political discourse issues regarding BelNPP are presented mostly in the present 
time. The reason for this (Table 15) is because BelNPP is ongoing project and there are significant 
amount of communications related to the construction of the power plant, its technical aspects etc. In 
Lithuania’s political discourses past time is most commonly used for communications regarding 
BelNPP as the project already became controversial and there are significant amount of content about 
issues on what Belarus has failed to achieve in the past. Also, communications on what has been done 
or what has not been done by Lithuania’s political actors on solving issues related to BelNPP takes 
place. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMENDATIONS 
Three main theoretical perspectives have been used in order to explain political discourses on 
Astravets nuclear power plant in Belarus and Lithuania: discursive institutionalism, agenda setting, and 
issue framing. These approaches explain how communicative political discourses could be framed and 
filtered by political institutions with a purpose to create the desired attitude towards certain issues. It 
has been relevant as BelNPP case is controversial both in Belarus and Lithuania. For a better 
understanding of the background of political discourses, review of energy politics and policies in 
Belarus and Lithuania has been performed. 
For the purposes of the empirical research, content analysis and discourse analysis 
methodologies were adapted. In this paper communications released by political institutions have been 
coded using Nvivo software for qualitative and mixed methods research. Data analysis methods 
included qualitative content analysis and quantitative content analysis: word frequency, cluster 
analysis, coding intensity, measuring relations between variables or measuring coding differences 
between texts. 
In Belarus political discourse the main topics under which Astravets nuclear power plant is 
discussed are: safety, technical aspects, information provision, and environment. In Lithuania’s case 
these are: safety, politics, environment, and information provision. The topic of safety is distinct as it is 
the most frequent in both of the discourses. As shown by cluster analysis, topics ‘environment’ and 
‘safety’ are communicated similarly in Belarusian discourse. As for Lithuania, topics ‘environment’ 
and ‘information provision’ also topics ‘politics’ and ‘safety’ were communicated similarly. The topics 
of ‘environment’ and ‘information provision’ might be communicated similarly because of their 
relation to the Espoo Convention, which is relevant in Lithuanian discourse, and which regalement’s 
how other parties have to be informed on environment related issues. The topics of ‘politics’ and 
‘safety’ reflect importance of politics related issues towards BelNPP in Lithuanian discourse. The most 
common discourse actors mentioned in Belarus political discourse are various international 
organizations or international conventions. IAEA was mentioned most frequently. This is because of 
cooperation in the nuclear safety field, as “safety” and “cooperation” are significantly important in 
Belarus discourses.  Also, mentioning of Lithuania and Russia is very frequent in Belarusian discourse. 
As for Lithuania, most frequently mentioned actors were Belarus and international organizations or 
conventions. Espoo convention was mentioned most frequently. Espoo Convention reflects important 
issue in Lithuania’s discourse – a lack of information being received from Belarus on environment 
related issues. International organizations and Russia are usually mentioned in Belarusian discourse in 
the light of cooperative relationships. Lithuania is mentioned in the light of conflicting, cooperative 
relationships or as a partner to be informed about something. In Lithuania’s discourse Belarus is 
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mentioned in strongly conflicting relation; international organizations are usually mentioned together 
with mentioning of cooperative relations. It is noted that Lithuania’s Government is mentioned in 
conflicting relation due to Parliaments criticism towards actions being taken by the government on 
BelNPP. The emotional load of Belarusian discourse is mostly positive or neutral, in Lithuanian 
discourse it is mostly negative. Lithuania strongly criticizes BelNPP project, although Belarus sees it 
in a positive and beneficial way. In the case of Belarus, topics of ‘safety’ and ‘information provision’ 
have mostly positive emotional load; topic ‘technical aspects’ – mostly neutral. In the case of 
Lithuania, the topics of ‘safety’, ‘politics’ and ‘environment’ are constructed mostly negatively. In 
Belarusian discourse, BelNPP is presented as a national level matter; in Lithuanian discourse, BelNPP 
is presented as a regional level issue. It is also evident, that Belarus speaks of BelNPP as of a 
nowadays issue (present tense), and Lithuania mostly uses past tenses to describe issues related to 
BelNPP. 
For a further research it would be valuable to adapt the same political institutional 
communicative discourse analysis method for more countries, for example Ukraine or Poland; because 
of two being located in the region and having indirect relation to the project. European Union and 
Russia are also significant in a context of BelNPP, but these actors have direct influence from 
Lithuania in the EU case, and from Belarus in the Russia’s case (or opposite), so it is not 
recommended to perform discourse analysis for these actors. Additional data would provide with more 
variables which can be used for explaining the reasons behind issue framing. It would be possible to 
further research these reasons to define their significance in a frame of BelNPP case. For example, if 
political Russia’s motives were behind the project. Furthermore, discourse analysis reflecting different 
timeline would be relevant. It can provide with data showing if discourse content has been different 
before or after the elections, or if it changed after the power plant became operational. Also media 
discourse analysis used instead of the political discourse analysis under the same topic would provide 
with data which then would be comparable to other research, previously mentioned in the introduction 
under similar topic, which was conducted using texts released before the construction of the power 
plant has started. This way it is possible to trace the development of the discourse content. 
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